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ABSTRACT            
 “Philosophical Influences in The Art of War found in The Romance of the Three 
Kingdoms” is an examination of Sunzi’s philosophy about leadership in The Art of War as 
applied to the moral character, or lack thereof, of historical Han Dynasty leaders, Liu Bei and 
Cao Cao. In Luo Guanzhong’s The Romance of the Three Kingdoms, the two are fictionalized 
with oppositional personalities and corresponding philosophical bases. I explore the ways in 
which their actions embody or reject the philosophy found in Sunzi’s The Art of War.   
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Preface  
The Connection Implied between The Art of War and The Romance of the Three Kingdoms 
2 
 
 
                        Trust no one who has read The Romance of the Three Kingdoms 
  —and do not trust the person who has read it more than three times!  
                                                                                  —Chengdu (Shu) saying 
Is there a connection between Luo Guanzhong’s The Romance of the Three Kingdoms 
and Sunzi's The Art of War? Both are often discussed independently in relation to classical or 
historical underpinnings, but I have found no research that specifically has answered this 
question. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to examine Sunzi’s The Art of War to discover if 
a relationship is implied between the text and its philosophical precepts and the mythological and 
historical characters and their actions and interactions in The Romance of the Three Kingdoms. 
My study of The Art of War as reflected in The Romance of the Three Kingdoms reveals a 
relationship between the two works.          
 My method of research is to examine the novel in light of the “analects” set forth in The 
Art of War to prove this relationship. I will discuss ways in which Luo Guanzhong’s epic1 
illustrates or does not illustrate Sunzi’s categories and ideology and by doing so will examine the 
interconnectivity of the texts. Therefore this thesis will explore the primary sources, The Art of 
War and The Romance of the Three Kingdoms, along with numerous secondary sources to be 
aware of the variety of scholarly opinions on the work.        
 Also basic to this study is the examination of the military strategist’s particular belief 
system. His is unlike the “self‒styled Confucians”2 who held “the orthodox philosophy and 
prescribed state view in the Former Han,” that “the ruler need only cultivate his Virtue, accord 
with the seasons, and implement benevolent policies in order to be successful in attracting 
                                                          
1
 Luo Guanzhong, Three Kingdoms: A Historical Novel, trans. Moss Roberts. (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1991. Rpt. 1996.). References within my thesis are to this text 
unless otherwise stated. 
2
 Ralph Sawyer and Mei-chün Lee Sawyer, Introduction to The Art of War by Sun-tzu, trans. 
Ralph D. Sawyer and Mei-chün Lee Sawyer (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 14, 
31.  
3 
 
 
universal support and fostering stability.”3         
 Conversely, he is not Daoist, yet his goals mimic the concepts of ying and yang: “. . . 
whoever occupies the battlefield first and awaits the enemy will be at ease; whoever occupies the 
battlefield afterward . . . will be fatigued.”4 Yet, he teaches that combat should be avoided by 
strategy if possible. If force is necessary, it is only in defense of the state because “[a]nger cannot 
revert to happiness, annoyance can revert to joy, but a vanquished state cannot be revived, the 
dead cannot be brought back to life.
5
        
 The issue of Sunzi’s philosophy is complicated and is made even more so by the fact that 
The Art of War was developed during Warring States Period, a watershed that produced a variety 
of philosophies (and well before the end of the Han Dynasty and its Three Kingdoms period). 
Therefore, throughout the study I clarify Sunzi’s philosophical beliefs. I have found no 
scholarship specifically related to this significant aspect concerning the strategist.  
Explicit Relationship 
 In a recently (1970’s) unearthed Yinqueshan Shandong Province Han Dynasty tomb, “a 
partial copy of The Art of War in essentially its traditional form” was discovered on “remarkably 
preserved bamboo slips.”6 This location proves the physical relationship between Sunzi’s work 
and locations referred to in The Romance of the Three Kingdoms. This finding is the only explicit 
connection I have found between the two works.          
 Implicit Relationship  
 According to Milena Doleželová-Velingerová, in the late twentieth century, modern 
                                                          
3
 Sun-tzu, The Art of War, trans. Ralph Sawyer and Mei-chün Lee Sawyer (Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1994), p. 32. References within my thesis are to this text unless otherwise 
stated. 
4
 Ibid., p. 191. 
5
 Ibid., p. 228. 
6
 Ralph Sawyer and Mei-chün Lee Sawyer, Introduction to The Art of War, p. 14.  
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scholars have “rediscovered the significance of the critical work of . . . Mao Zonggang” whose 
commentaries were added to the chapters of The Three Kingdoms in the seventeenth century and 
“excised in the early twentieth century from modern editions.”7 Unlike early twentieth‒century 
critics who looked upon works like The Romance of the Three Kingdoms
8
 as describing the 
realities of Chinese social life but as lacking “architectural development,”9 Mao Zonggang saw 
the text as “not modeling the actual world” but as a “fictional [construct] based on the author’s 
recognition of the principles [my emphasis] that govern the actual world, the patterning of the 
individual fictional [construct] is modeled according to principles analogous [my emphasis] with 
those governing the actual world.”10          
 In other words, the structure is as significant as the “manipulation of the historical 
facts”11 because Mao Zonggang recognized the work’s philosophical and organic internal 
relationship as a reflection of a “historically‒based view of the legitimacy of the base text, The 
Three Kingdoms.”12 In 1976 Winston Yan agreed: the work “belongs to the yen-I type of 
historical chronicle mainly based on an official history. As such, it is not sufficiently truthful to 
be accepted as authentic history nor sufficiently fictionalized with historical imagination to be 
considered creative fiction.”13           
                                                          
7
 Milena Doleželová-Velingerová, “Seventeenth‒Century Chinese Theory of Narrative,” Poetics 
East and West. Ed. Milena Doleželová-Velingerová. Monograph Series of the Toronto Semiotic 
Circle, Number 4, 1988-9. p.140. 
8
 Doleželová-Velingerova’s article is about critics of three Chinese narratives: The Romance of 
the Three Kingdoms, The Water Margin, and Golden Lotus. 
9
 Alison Bailey, “Microstructure and Macrostructure: Mao Zonggnang’s Discourse on The 
Romance of the Three Kingdoms,” Poetics East and West. Ed. Milena Doleželová‒Velingerová. 
Monograph Series of the Toronto Semiotic Circle, Number 4, 1988‒9. pp.159‒160. 
10
 Ibid., p. 159.  
11
 Ibid., p. 160. 
12
 Ibid., p. 160. 
13
 Winston L.Y. Yang, “Teaching Chinese Through Chinese Literature,” The Modern Language 
Journal 60, no ½ (Jan.‒Feb., 1976): p. 33. 
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 A contemporary who wrote an introduction for The Water Margin, Jin Shengtan, defined 
historiography as distinct from a novelistic text: “the former uses (narrative) writing to represent 
real events (yiwen yunshi), while the latter creates events to meet the needs of the narrative (yin 
wen shengshi).
14
 Yet, Mao Zonggang saw The Romance of the Three Kingdom’s principles as 
tied directly to ”traditional Chinese conceptions of the natural world” in that “a hierarchy of 
emphasis does exist even while [the original author, Luo Guanzhong,] stresses the necessity of 
each and every constituent element to the integrity of the whole.”15    
 The study of The Romance of the Three Kingdoms in light of the principles found in The 
Art of War proves that such an organic connection exists in a work that is a compilation of 
historical accounts and fictional legend. This connectivity is found in Liu Bei and Cao Cao, 
historical figures in their fictional forms, whom I have examined through the lens of Sunzi’s 
leadership philosophies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
14
 Wu, Hua L., “The Concept of Parallelism: Jin Shengtan’s Critical Discourse on The Water 
Margin,” Poetics East and West. Ed. Milena Doleželová-Velingerová. Monograph Series of the 
Toronto Semiotic Circle, Number 4, 1988‒9. p. 177. 
15
 Bailey, p. 163. 
6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
A Brief Historical and Textual Background of The Romance of the Three Kingdoms 
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Luo Guanzhong’s The Romance of the Three Kingdoms was written approximately 
twelve hundred years after the historical events it relates. The story is found in two versions, one 
published in 1522 and the other in the mid-1660’s.16 From its inception, The Romance of the 
Three Kingdoms has elicited interest and reaction from a diverse audience in a variety of 
disciplines. This is, in part, because the text reflects human experience, as found in literary, 
philosophical, historical, economical, and martial studies, intriguing scholars and laymen 
throughout the centuries. In the last half of the 20th century and the first few years of the 21st, 
modern philosophers have challenged the findings of previous scholars on the basis of bias or the 
discovery of new techniques or works that clarified textual ambiguities that had perplexed even 
the closest of readers. This study, however, is not necessarily a challenge to previous findings; 
instead it is an addition to them and an examination of the philosophy of one classic text, Sunzi’s 
The Art of War, as it applies to the epic.  
Historical Background         
 During the Later Han (25‒220 AD), a faction of powerful eunichs began to control the 
court. By 189 AD, they were overcome, and wherever they had held power over weak emperors, 
warlords took their places. One warlord was General Dong Zhuo who sacked the Han capital, 
Luoyang, but was defeated by Cao Cao, the regent for the child emperor Xian. Cao Cao also 
helped to crush the Yellow Turban (Yellow Scarves) rebellion, an uprising of starving peasants. 
He then began his plan to attain the throne of Wei and to destroy the Han Dynasty. Leaders Sun 
Quan represented Wu (another of the Three Kingdoms) and Liu Bei of Shu (the third kingdom) 
                                                          
16
 Moss Roberts. Afterward in “About Three Kingdoms.” Three Kingdoms: A Historical Novel. 
Abridged Edition. By Luo Guanzhong. Translated by Moss Roberts (1991. Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1999), p. 917. The second version was translated by Mao Zonggang. 
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attempted to keep each other in check, which would have maintained the Han throne. These three 
"kingdoms" would never consolidate their power. Eventually, Sima Yan, a former general of Cao 
Cao would control Wei and end the rule of Cao Pi (Cao Cao’s heir).  
Creative Influences on The Romance of the Three Kingdoms    
 A variety of theories exist as to Luo Guanzhong’s purposes in writing his version of the 
Three Kingdoms story, but one of the most plausible is that during Mongol rule during Yuan, 
works appeared that were pro-Han, rather than favoring Jin (their enemy and associated with Cao 
Cao). Because Han militancy against foreign rule (Mongols) was increasing, “the government 
sought to fortify its legitimacy by appropriating . . .  national symbols,” found in the story line.17 
The Mongols wished to legitimate their rule by comparing Wei, Wu, and Shu as examples of 
dynasties that had been absorbed by others (Jin) with those “non-entities” that had been usurped 
by Yuan. The protagonists of their stories became vessels for propaganda to promote the 
questioning of previous dynasties’ legitimacy. Luo Guanzhong lived during the period of 
transition from Yuan to Ming, and his work may be seen as an attempt at “restoration of 
Han‒like rule in China.”18           
 Even if this claim were false and the work is of a later period (which some argue), the 
Mongols engendered fierce “Han‒nationalist” anger when they suppressed an uprising led by 
Emperor Yin Zong and exiled him to Mongolia. Moreover, during this same period, peasant 
uprisings were becoming commonplace and eunuchs were once again gaining power at court. All 
of the events mentioned could have been the catalyst for creating an epic that tells of the fall of 
Han—a dynasty admired by Ming—as a warning to heed. Moss Roberts suggests that if this 
theory is correct, the author may have wished to be anonymous as a precaution and used the pen 
                                                          
17
 Ibid., p. 961. 
18
 Ibid., p. 964. 
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name of another author (who had no works as significant as The Romance of the Three 
Kingdoms) to protect himself. A later editor, Mao Zonggang, explored “three forms of 
succession: “legitimate, transitional, and usurped” and continued to stress Luo Guanzhong’s 
focus on Han legitimacy by “deleting lines that describe Cao Cao’s better and Liu Bei’s worse 
qualities.”19             
 The study I offer is of the philosophical influence of Sunzi’s work as seen in Luo 
Guanzhong’s fictional artifact rather than on historical characters or actions. 
Thesis Overview 
Chapter I: A brief overview of the philosophies generally believed to be represented in  
 The Romance of the Three Kingdoms, Confucianism, Daoism, and Legalism, and   
 representative scholarship. The majority of the scholarship that I encountered points to 
 Confucianism as the main philosophy promoted in the epic.  
Chapter II: An exploration of The Art of War and the conceptions and misconceptions of Sunzi’s 
 philosophy in relation to modern leadership practices.    
Chapter III: A study of “benevolence,” a virtue required to attain the Mandate of Heaven 
 (leadership) in the epic, in relation to Sunzi’s ideal leader and two leaders in The 
 Romance of the Three Kingdoms. 
Chapter IV: An examination of “The Mandate of Heaven” and its attainment during Han as 
 portrayed in The Romance of the Three Kingdoms in relation to Sunzi’s ideal leader as 
 found in The Art of War.  
                                                          
19
 Ibid., p. 966. 
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Cross References          
 For clarity, I have signified my cross‒referenced chapters with Roman numerals and 
identified chapters from The Romance of the Three Kingdoms with Arabic numerals. 
Characters Mentioned from The Romance of the Three Kingdoms  
Cao Cao: A non-aristocrat who manipulated Han Emperor Xian and usurped his power.   
Cao Pi: Cao Cao’s son and eventual leader of Wei Kingdom after deposing Emperor Xian. 
Guan Yu: One of the three Peach Tree Garden pact brothers. After his death in battle, he haunts 
 Cao Cao. Upon hearing of Lord Guan Yu’s death, Liu Bei loses his discerning leadership 
 qualities. 
Liu Bang: Emperor Gaozu of Han. (First Han emperor.) 
Liu Bei: Leader of Shu whom many believed to be the heir to the Han Dynasty. One of the three 
 Peach Tree Garden pact brothers. 
Liu Xian: Last Han Emperor.  
Lu Bu: A Warlord who was an enemy to Cao Cao who sends him to Liu Bei in hopes of his 
  murder.  
Pang Tong: Young advisor of Liu Bei who advises him to kill Lu Bu. 
Sun Quan: Leader of Wu Kingdom.  
Yellow Turbans: Peasants who rebelled due to agrarian distress caused by the flooding of the 
 Yellow River. The rebellion is the opening of The Romance of the  Three  Kingdoms.  
Zhang Fei: A general for the Shu Dynasty and one of the Peach Tree Garden pact  brothers.  
Zhang Liang: An early Han strategist who assisted in founding the Han Dynasty. 
Zhuge Liang: Liu Bei’s most trusted advisor. 
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Chapter I 
Philosophical Influence in The Romance of the Three Kingdoms
12 
 
 
In order to properly discuss the philosophical influence of The Art of War as found in The 
Romance of the Three Kingdoms, it is important to recognize that much of today’s criticism of 
the epic relates to the connections between Confucianism and the text's characters or their 
actions. Consequently, this chapter is primarily devoted to explaining representative studies of 
this particular philosophy as it relates to the historical novel. Also addressed are representative 
studies by those who find Daoist or Legalist influence in the work. Therefore, this chapter is a 
brief overview of Confucianism, Daoism and Legalism in contemporary interpretive contexts 
pertaining to The Romance of the Three Kingdoms. 
Confucianism 
 Confucianism is a philosophy with multiple variants. To limit its definition, which could 
in itself be an entire thesis, I define the term in relation to those who called themselves followers 
of Confucius (Confucians) during the time frame of the popularization of the Three Kingdom 
legend (220‒280 CE). Not until the 14th century C.E. would Luo Guanzhong create The 
Romance of the Three Kingdoms as a historical romance. Also for the purposes of this chapter 
and my thesis, I will limit my definition to include those who uphold and defend Wuchang, the 
five traditional moral principles of ren (benevolence), yi (righteousness), li (ritual), zhi 
(knowledge), and xin (integrity).
20
 These five principles are codified through ritual and 
reverence. Their "[defense of] traditional values is a determinative feature that distinguishes both 
Confucius and his followers from other schools."
21
 Fundamentally, followers of Confucius 
believe that heaven and earth coexist in an equal and dynamic interplay. Any individual can live 
                                                          
20
 “Confucianism,” Dictionary of Philosophy, edited by Dagobert D. Runes (New York: 
Philosophical Library, 1983), p. 338. 
21
 Liang Cai, "Why is Xing zi ming chu a Confucian Text?  Situating the Xing zi ming chu in 
Early Chinese Intellectual History," Between the Si-Meng Lineage and Xunzi: A Study of the 
Newly Discovered Text The Xing Zi Ming Chu. Master's Thesis. Cornell University, 2003. pp. 
10, 22. 
13 
 
 
a life that aligns with the cosmos if he sustains zhong yong (the mean)—the equilibrium of the 
universe—by pursuing harmony and balance. Because this harmony depends not only on heaven 
but also on man, the individual is of central importance, especially in regard to internalizing 
Wuchang through rituals to become partner with the universe. Yet, man also exists within the 
hierarchy of society. Therefore, Tian ming (the Mandate of Heaven) insures that individuals are 
ruled in concordance with the cosmos because only through zhong yong (the mean) can a leader 
remain in power. Eventually the concept of Tian ming became associated with dynastic cycles—
when a dynasty could rise and stay in power, but Tian ming could be lost when an Emperor loses 
favor with Heaven. The Romance of the Three Kingdoms is set in such a moment, when Late 
Han is in chaos.      
Confucian Interpretive Context 
  “The Beginning of the End: The Fall of the Han and the Opening of Three Kingdoms” by 
George A. Hayden focuses on chaos according to traditional Chinese historical fiction and 
historiography found in The Romance of the Three Kingdoms. Hayden states that Sima Guang’s 
Comprehensive Mirror for Aid in Government reveals that the symptoms that resulted in the 
decline of the Eastern Han reflected corruption from the top down, and the combination of the 
symptoms resulted in the anger of the people and the loss of Tian ming (The Mandate of 
Heaven).
22
 Hayden contrasts Sima Guang’s straight‒forward historical account of the fall of the 
Han and the rise of the Three Kingdoms with Mao Zonggang’s23 Three Kingdoms edition with 
its even more direct connection between the Yellow Scarves and the depraved eunuchs of the 
court. Hayden states that in these historical accounts, the interpretations of portents are codified 
                                                          
22
 George A. Hayden, “The Beginning of the End: The Fall of the Han and the Opening of Three 
Kingdoms,” Three Kingdoms and Chinese Culture edited by Kimberly Besio and Constantine 
Tung (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007), p. 44.  
23
 Ibid., pp. 44‒45. 
14 
 
 
reflections of contemporary governmental problems and predictors of future trends or 
occurrences. The novel, on the other hand, places the portents in “reflective and predictive 
functions” in order to show reactions of the characters in the context of Confucian beliefs.24 (See 
Chapter IV.) For instance, after Heaven sent down omens and portents as the Yellow Scarves 
began their rebellion, three of the main characters of the epic reacted to political corruption with 
yi (righteousness) and xin (integrity), meeting in the Peach Tree Garden to form an alignment to 
support their Emperor. 
 Also, relating Confucianism historically to The Romance of the Three Kingdoms is “The 
Notion of Appropriateness (Yi) in Three Kingdoms” by Jiyuan Yu who claims that the epic has a 
clear relationship to classical Confucianism’s conception of appropriateness.25  The purpose of 
his study is to explain why there is a lack of specificity inherent within the value of 
appropriateness, a concept, he says, that illustrates the complexity of Confucianism. Yu’s goal is 
significant in that The Romance of the Three Kingdoms was instrumental in infusing Confucian 
precepts like appropriateness into the structure of the culture.
26
 Yu claims that the capacity to 
discern what is proper while outside social constraints is important, although there is another 
view of appropriateness—a “cultivated [second] nature"—which determines how to internalize 
the ritual.
27
 The author finds that the main characters of the epic are dealing with this second 
application, internalizing the ritual.
28
 (For example, Liu Bei should not appropriate the land of 
particular lords, but he must do so to save his kingdom.) According to Yu, this rationale is as 
                                                          
24
 Ibid., p. 49. 
25
 Jiyuan Yu, “The Notion of Appropriateness (Yi) in Three Kingdoms,” Three Kingdoms and 
Chinese Culture edited by Kimberly Besio and Constantine Tung (Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 2007), p. 27. 
26
 Ibid., p. 27 
27
 Ibid., p. 28. 
28
 Ibid., p. 31. 
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vague in regard to specific choices at particular moments in the epic as it is in Confucianism 
itself. The relationship between friends and superiors is another area that is uncertain when it 
comes to this value of appropriateness, he says. In fact, this ambiguity creates a tension in The 
Romance of the Three Kingdoms, placing characters like Liu Bei between the appropriateness 
accorded to kingship (“great appropriateness”) and that accorded to kinship (“small 
appropriateness”).29 (See discussion of Lu Bu and Liu Bei in Chapters III and IV.) Yu’s 
explanation reveals such tensions as necessary to the greatness of the epic with its reliance on 
ambiguity and complexity. He contends that the literary value of the epic would be diminished 
without the resulting dilemmas and that, given the relationship between the philosophy and the 
text, the success of this historical novel may indicate that Confucianism, with its focus on the 
ambiguous nature of a “character and virtues of a moral agent, grasp[s] the true complexity of 
human ethical life.”30  
 While there is no doubt that the philosophy is complex, Paul R. Golden disagrees with 
Yu's perceptions concerning ambiguity in "The Theme of Primacy of the Situation in Classical 
Chinese Philosophy and Rhetoric." According to Golden, shu (reciprocity) is misunderstood by 
Western scholars who believe it to mean equality in interactions. Instead, what is appropriate is 
determined by the social roles of those interacting, what he calls a "calculus of shu."
31
 While 
Golden does not directly address The Romance of the Three Kingdoms, his thesis relates to its 
characters and their actions and to Yu's thesis that what is appropriate action is often ambiguous 
in Confucianism. Golden's explanation both clarifies Yu's argument and reiterates the complexity 
of Confucianism. 
                                                          
29
 Ibid., p. 33. 
30
 Ibid., p. 39. 
31
 Paul R. Golden, "The Theme of Primacy of the Situation in Classical Chinese Philosophy and 
Rhetoric," Asia Minor 18.2 (2005): pp. 2. 
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 In addition to philosophical complexity, Hoyt Tillman’s cause and effect study of the 
sometimes distorted manner in which historical record is shaped and reshaped in mainstream 
interpretations adds to our understanding of the novel. Tillman’s article “Historic Analogies and 
Evaluative Judgments: Zhuge Liang as Portrayed in Chen Shou’s ‘Chronicle of the Three 
Kingdoms’ and Pei Songzhi’s Commentary” claims a Confucian influence on historical 
conceptions that eventually coalesce in The Romance of the Three Kingdoms. Tillman illustrates 
his claim by examining the perception of one character from the epic, Zhuge Liang—Liu Bei’s 
faithful advisor. The author’s theory is that analogies and metaphors used by historians tend to 
influence other historians’ impressions or assumptions and that, because of this authorial 
intrusion, Zhuge’s image as hero was incrementally elevated historically and allegorically from 
its most accurate evaluation as an effective Confucian administrator to the more impressive 
image of a sage.
32
 The author says that an unrealistic conception as recorded by Pei's 
Commentary overshadowed Chen’s more realistic one. 
 Kim Besio also discusses Zhuge Liang and the way characters act or react in accordance 
to philosophical precepts in “Zhuge Liang and Zhang Fei: Bowang shao tun and Competing 
Masculine Ideals within the Development of the Three Kingdoms Story Cycle.” She observes in 
The Romance of the Three Kingdoms the portrayal of two models of masculinity, honorable or 
unscrupulous, and studies the varying attitudes through the years about these notions. Besio 
chooses to examine two editions (from Yuan Dynasty 1271 to 1368 C.E. and from Ming Dynasty 
1368‒1644 C.E.) of one play from the story cycle, zaju Boawang shao tun.33 The history of the 
                                                          
32
 Hoyt Cleveland Tillman, “Historic Analogies and Evaluative Judgments: Zhuge Liang as 
Portrayed in Chen Shou’s ‘Chronicle of the Three Kingdoms’: and Pei Songzhi’s Commentary.” 
Oriens Extremus 43 (2002): p. 70. 
33
 Kim Besio, “Zhuge Liang and Zhang Fei, Bowang shao tun and Competing Masculine Ideals 
within the Development of the Three Kingdoms Story Cycle,” Three Kingdoms and Chinese 
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variations between these versions reflects a pattern of modification of drama technique and of 
masculine ideals that relate to the formation of the novel itself, as “the characters tended to be 
reshaped to better accord with Confucian orthodox values.”34 Zhuge Liang had been a hero 
during his life, and folk tradition portrayed him positively as one capable of magical feats. 
Conversely, historian Chen Shou (mentioned above) had recorded Zhang Fei as being a violent 
person.
35
* The two characters continue to be opposites in all versions of the story, and their 
explicit contrast is especially suited to the stage. Besio finds that, over time, dramatic technique 
changed between the two versions of the zaju genre examined, and the changes affected cultural 
perceptions of the characters.  During Yuan, the focus was on one character, Zhuge, whose 
motivations are revealed as more practical than his later interpreted ambitious self.
36
 The author 
says that this later version supported the Ming imperial agenda due to its stress on loyalty to the 
throne by the beloved character and to its focus on his lofty ideals.
37
 Besio argues that the Zhang 
model of belligerent masculinity in the play eventually became merely a foil for the more 
orthodox and rational seeming Zhuge, not only on stage but also in the novel.
38
 Thus the model 
reinforces the text’s relationship to Confucian philosophy and zhong yong (the mean). 
 Similar to Besio’s study of a specific genre to illustrate its historical and philosophical 
relationship to the epic, Catherine Pagani’s “The Theme of Three Kingdoms in Chinese Popular 
Woodblock Prints” follows the development and social implications of nianhua, 
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become weak when Buddhism or Daoism started to become somewhat influential. Therefore 
Ming drama was directly influenced by those in power, and they preferred the Confucian model. 
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woodblock‒printed New Year's pictures). Pagani discusses the medium's connection to the 
dramatic versions of the epic, particularly a few popular and easily recognizable scenes from the 
book that “reinforced Confucian conceptions of moral goodness and moral badness central to 
Chinese culture.”39 Pagani contends that nianhua and theater functioned together visually to 
“disseminate . . . ideas across Chinese culture” that represent the popular tastes of traditional 
China.
40
 Because the wood blocks were inexpensive and involved low-levels of technology and 
cost, their depictions were especially useful in influencing the consciousness of non‒literate 
citizens, reaffirming the social mores of the times—such as Confucian lessons on loyalty or 
dishonor as depicted in scenes such as "The Capture and Liberation of Cao Cao"
41
 (one of the 
two characters discussed at length in this study). 
 The characters that Pagani studies appear to be timeless, and in Three Kingdoms at the 
Dawn of the Twenty‒First Century: The Shanghai Jingju Company's Cao Cao and Yan Xiu,” 
Elizabeth Wichmann-Walczak relates that the resurgence of yet another ancient genre—jinju 
performance—proves this observation to be true and reveals the play’s success in not only 
reaching into the past but also revealing current dilemmas. This resurgence, she believes, gives 
encouragement to the future of the genre, as well as the continuation of the popularity of the 
epic itself.  The playwright’s dilemma was to create characters that still represent the 
philosophical values of the original text, de (virtue) and Tian ming (the Mandate of Heaven).
42
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Wichmann-Walczak points to the difficulty in creating an innovative reinterpretation, especially 
in the characterization of a modern Cao Cao. Elements of the play incorporate changes in the 
status quo—the setting and the musical score's “haunting classical flavor” (though quicker paced 
than in past versions) relies on tradition despite its innovations. These adaptations create what 
Wichmann-Walczak calls “contemporary Chinese emotionalism.”43 This empathy for the 
characters in The Romance of the Three Kingdoms is another layer of innovation for this 
prize‒winning play. Playwright Yaxian Chen says there is an audience recognition that the play 
embodies “the principal Chinese weakness—one Chinese alone is great, but two will argue and 
destroy each other.”44 His statement is reiterated by Wichmann-Walczak's recognition that Cao 
Cao's uncompromising character represents a timeless, universal political failure.  Despite its 
creative departure from tradition, the play is “quite possibly closer to much older literary and 
historical views” of the characters and actions than some may realize, thus creating a cultural 
bridge for Confucianism and its twenty-first-century audience.
45
  
 Dominic Cheung discusses a cultural bridge but one connecting the East and West in 
relation to the epic's tragic characteristics in “Essential Regrets: The Structure of Tragic 
Consciousness in Three Kingdoms.” The author argues that analyzing the disillusionment of the 
heroes' “tragic consciousness” in the novel reveals a historical pattern of regret, formulating a 
tragic outcome from non-fulfillment of expectations or events.
46
 Cheung’s thesis about the 
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pattern of regretful events is illustrated in The Romance of the Three Kingdoms through the 
actions of major characters like Zhuge Liang who eventually recognizes his own limited lifespan 
and realizes his inability to resist or reverse the Mandate of Heaven. Cheung compares the 
traditional conceptions of the Western tragic hero to the characteristics of the Eastern epic hero 
and finds that both share the flaw of “wrath.” Cheung counts more than one hundred examples of 
this flaw in the epic, finding a pattern of wrath in Cao Cao’s dealings with others, as well as with 
Liu Bei’s seeking revenge. The author offers a Freudian explanation of this aggressive tendency: 
The more an individual inhibits desire, the more a subconscious resistance to control arises, 
eventually erupting into wrathful action.
47
 At the end of Han, he says strong ethical codes were 
necessary to control these brutal instincts by transforming them into friendships, like those 
leading to the catalysmic Peach Garden alliance mentioned earlier.
48
  
 Related to the idea of this psychological interpretation of a traditional text and its 
Confucian influence, Jinhee Kim's study of “The Reception and the Place of Three Kingdoms in 
South Korea”49 is significant in its focus on the reader, regardless of cultural background, as 
being the actual creator of meaning in any given text. Kim’’s claim is based not only on the 
knowledge of the epic as literature or history but also on the knowledge of reader response or 
reception theory: A reader's mind is designed to fill inadvertent gaps it finds in any given text 
with his or her own cache of information. That information is culturally based, and therefore, the 
meaning of any text relies on the reader rather than authorial intentions.
50 Kim’s discussion 
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focuses on a particular set of readers: Asian, non-Chinese, specifically Korean—an audience that 
has claimed its own culturally based version of the epic since translations of the written text (Sam 
guk chi) began appearing in the nineteenth-century.  Scholars created this revisionist epic by 
finding non-traditional qualities in characters like Cao Cao who is seen—at least in the Sam guk 
chi version—as a positive character, one who depends on his own hard work.51 Kim’s argument 
is that any given reader, as a producer of meaning, has the power to recreate The Romance of the 
Three Kingdoms from his or her own worldview or philosophy. 
 Outside of the traditional philosophical studies of The Romance of the Three Kingdoms 
as a Chinese text, as I just mentioned, scholars from other Eastern cultures are examining their 
own versions of the epic in relation to the dissemination and influence of Chinese culture and 
philosophy. In her recent dissertation “The Ethical Principles in The Romance of the Three 
Kingdoms,” Waraporn Wiseitpanichkit categorizes ethical behaviors in The Romance of the 
Three Kingdoms as “translated sometime before 1808 C.E. by Chaophraya Praklang” for Siam’s 
King Rama I.
52
 Rama I’s purpose was to create a noble class that would not only understand 
military strategy but also know how to govern well and to follow the text’s lessons of loyalty.53 
She examines this agenda in relation to Confucian ethics (the ethics she says that underlie the 
Chinese text) and Buddhist ethics (which underlie the Thai translation). Wiseitpanichkit also 
provides examples of episodes that illustrate Confucian ethical principles like gratitude to family 
members and ancestors, respectfulness to seniority, or courteousness and mutual sympathy and 
understanding to all. The author likewise discusses and illustrates Buddhist values, such as 
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mercifulness, and emphasizes the continuing importance that The Romance of the Three 
Kingdoms represents for Thai culture because the epic's moral lessons are encoded in the 
country's psyche, having been codified into Rama I’s “translation” of Siam into Thailand. 
Relatedly, the author examines the textual history of The Romance of the Three Kingdoms and its 
translation and the major philosophical beliefs portrayed in the original and the translated 
versions. Wiseitpanichkit's insights are those of an audience outside of the original “translated” 
culture of the text but also as one immersed in the philosophies of King Rama I's translated text. 
Daoism 
 Like Confucianism, Daoism is a complex philosophy, but its followers do share the 
common values of moderation, humility, and compassion. They also share the ideal of living in 
harmony with the cosmos in order to maintain health and attain longevity. But Daoists have an 
aversion to Confucian ritual and order, instead finding the Dao (the way) through wu wei (action 
through inaction) or deeds harmonious with nature, rather than through status or authority.  
Daoism's focus is on the natural cycles and interactions of and with nature—wuxing (five 
movements), which are interdependent phases alternating in space and time consisting of earth 
(tu), metal (jin) water (shui), wood (mu), and fire (huo). Related to these interactions are the 
concepts of yin and yang, which are emblems of the Dao itself, in its harmonious interplay of 
opposites in the cosmos.
54
 
Daoist Interpretive Contexts  
Jiang Sheng does not mention The Romance of the Three Kingdoms in “Early Religious 
Taoism and the Re-understanding of History of the Han through the Three Kingdoms.”  
Nevertheless Sheng’s research does inform the study of modern philosophical discussions of the 
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epic because his work offers insight into the political, social, and philosophical interactions 
during the time the original story takes place. Over time, Sheng says, these interactions 
culminated in early religious Daoism, which was “the outcome of a movement originating in the 
inner structure of Qin‒Han society that in turn exerted a considerable [influence in] the social 
and political order from the Han to the Wei.”55 The author points to Lawrence Schneider’s 
discussion on the merging of doctrines such as the Interaction between Heaven and Man and the 
Cycling of the Virtues of the Five Elements (a system designed to challenge the claims to the 
Mandate of Heaven based on the "rotation" of the elements identified as belonging to a particular 
historical timeframe).
56
 This identification of each virtue with a historical era, Sheng says, was 
used as an “ideological [tool] for the interpretation of . . . orthodox ideas and politics.”57 (See 
Chapter IV.) The synthesis of doctrines resulted in the theory of Catastrophism, which came to 
dominate the ideology of the Han dynasty and therefore is an important factor relating to modern 
philosophical discourse concerning The Romance of the Three Kingdoms. To eliminate the 
tension between Heaven and man was of utmost importance for Catastrophists, and Han 
emperors proclaimed their own flaws, to “dispel catastrophes [such as floods or earthquakes] 
through certain subjective acts.”58 Sheng calls this philosophical mode of thinking “one of the 
most important intellectual causes for the birth of religious Taoism.”59 
 Especially interesting for the present study, Catastrophism influenced “the political life in 
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the Han dynasty.”60 The author finds that doubts concerning the righteousness of the Han regime 
were based on systematic catastrophes, “religious interpretation in early Taoist scripture,” and 
eschatological beliefs of the time.  Rebellions or subversions can be viewed as the people’s 
attempts to survive and as indicative of “the spirituality of the society, from the emperor to the 
ordinary people,” which formulated a state religion developed under the stresses of a 
dynamically changing society.
61* 
Therefore the politicization of religion through symbolic 
association (“only the yellow earth has the virtue to dispel the flood” [my emphasis]) set the 
stage for the events that would be related eventually to readers of The Romance of the Three 
Kingdoms.
62
 The association also explains the logic for Cao Cao’s suppression of the Yellow 
Turban Uprising, his uniting with the rebels’ surviving forces, and later his overthrowing Liu 
Xian’s Daoist regime, followed by his son (Cao Pi) founding Wei, “[t]he dynasty that comes to 
follow heaven’s order. . . .”63  
 Robert Gray also discusses Daoist influence in “An Analysis of the Role of QI in Military 
Strategy as Outlined in Three Kingdoms (Sanguo Yanyi). The Romance of the Three Kingdoms 
has affected not only the Chinese culture in general but also its training in military strategies and 
tactics. Gray's discussion of the concept of qi (energy) in the epic reveals that the 
“Daoist‒influenced principles” of one of the epic's major sources have similarities to Sunzi’s 
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philosophy in his The Art of War.
 64
 Particularly, Gray focuses on the military decisions or 
strategies within the storyline that relate to the concept of manipulating qi to gain advantage over 
one’s foes. In The Art of War (500 BC), the idea of qi as an emotional state of the troops was 
first acknowledged, and in Sanguo Yanyi, the manipulation of qi is displayed on numerous 
occasions with expected outcomes. Gray’s contention is that the repeated lessons within The 
Romance of the Three Kingdoms were more effective to their enculturation than any of the actual 
military texts that pragmatically list and discuss strategies.       
 To illustrate his thesis, Gray contrasts instances in the novel when leaders use superior or 
inferior tactics in relation to qi, the most  obvious being the tactic of controlling emotion. 
Through examples found in The Romance of the Three Kingdoms of tactics designed to suspend 
rational thought, Gray explains that the manipulation of qi requires the rational analyses of 
strengths and weaknesses. The author also equates qi to modern gaming theory, which is based 
on going beyond self awareness in order to understand what others may think and do, a 
characteristic trait reflecting what Gray calls Sunzi’s “Daoist‒influenced principles” found in 
The Art of War—“subtle! Subtle! . . . approach[ing] the formless.”65      
 Gray’s purpose in his study concerning qi in The Romance of the Three Kingdoms is to 
understand the military lessons of Sunzi’s “effortless effort” found in the novel and to “elucidate 
the strategic traditions found throughout Chinese military history.”66 More significantly, he finds 
the epic to be a template illustrating the ways the Chinese think about strategic issues in general 
and shaping the decisions they have made or followed throughout generations.  
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Legalism 
 Just as Confucianism and Daoism are complex philosophies with core precepts, so, too, is 
the School of Law (Fa chia) or Legalism. According to Arthur Waley, Legalists were China’s 
first political philosophers who “[started] not from where society ought to be but how it is.”67 
The basic tenet for Legalists is that “good government depends . . . [not] on the moral worth of 
persons, but on the functioning of sound institutions,” and these institutions require conformity.68 
Therefore, a ruler’s “knowledge, ability, moral worth, warrior spirit . . . are wholly irrelevant; he 
simply performs his function in the impersonal mechanism of state.”69 According to A. C. 
Graham, Legalists work from a cause and effect model based on Seven Standards: equally 
balanced principles (tse ), standards (fa), “measuring and likening to oneself” (shu), 
consistencies or statistics (Shi) exemplars or models (hsiang), habituating or transforming, and 
incentives and deterrents.
70
 Without benevolent considerations, standards for behavior drive 
systematic reward or punishment by and for the state. 
Legalist Interpretive Context 
 Antonio Michael Carmone’s 1978 dissertation, “The Literary and Philosophical Values in 
the Romance of the Three Kingdoms” focuses mainly on the narrative elements of the epic. 
Although he finds influences from Confucianism, Daoism, and Legalism in seemingly 
fragmented episodes which may appear to be unrelated to one another, he states that they are 
interrelated by conflicts that arise throughout the story. Moreover, conflicting ideologies are 
integral to the overall conflicts that arise in the narrative. Carmone discusses the difficult 
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situations in which characters find themselves when caught between more than one philosophical 
belief. He says that the reader can become pessimistic while reading The Romance of the Three 
Kingdoms if focused on only the Legalist predatory purposes of characters like Cao Cao or Sun 
Qian who use righteousness and patriotism as smokescreens for ambition.
71
 The author posits 
that Luo Guanzhong may have wished that his readers would examine the repercussions of the 
“civilized” Legalists’ principles in “contrast with those of the naked ‘barbarians.’”72 The 
mechanical and rigid rule of law appears to justify the atrocities committed by the eunuchs at the 
beginning of the story and throughout. But regardless of its realistic portrayal of the worst of 
human nature, the author says that the epic counters this view with the “consistency in noble 
deeds and words on the part of such people” as Zhuge Liang, Liu Bei, or Zhang Fei, which 
places the novel back into the realm of Confucianism.
73
 
 Although modern Western readers often wish to associate Legalism with Chinese culture 
in its historical texts, it is important to realize that the majority of representative sinologists I 
have discussed do not find The Romance of the Three Kingdoms to be based on Legalism, 
regardless of modern political realities and interpretations. As Jinhee Kim and Waraporn 
Wiseitpanichkit reveal, interpretation is often culturally based. This is especially true of those 
who are not necessarily historians or scholars. Therefore, the somewhat misconceived Western 
interpretation of the novel as Legalistic is most likely due to superimposing modern cultural 
notions onto a medieval text. Because I will be discussing the philosophical influences The Art of 
War exerts on The Romance of the Three Kingdoms and because the interpretation of The Art of 
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War can affect Western readers’ interpretations of the epic, my next chapter is a discussion of 
Western conceptions and misconceptions of Sunzi’s The Art of War. 
29 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter II 
The Art of War and Western Leadership Practices
30 
 
 
Most Westerners are more comfortable with blogs or video games than with ancient 
Chinese texts. But among the modern readers who have examined The Art of War in relation to 
its use for development or justification of aggressive Western business management practices, a 
common thread of agreement exists. Sunzi’s message is a significant source of insight into 
successful leadership strategies. However, an additional theme that emerges among sinologists is 
that Sunzi’s text has been misinterpreted or misrepresented by Westerners. Within this group are 
those who agree that without understanding the underlying philosophies of The Art of War and 
without recognizing or acknowledging cultural bias, much of the past century’s scientifically 
researched corporate techniques based on Sunzi’s statements are out of context of both the text 
and its derivative culture. In this chapter, I explain a representative selection of criticism and 
interpretation of Sunzi’s philosophical design by Hai-Fa Sun, Chao-Chuan Chen, and She-He 
Zhang in “Strategic Leadership of Sunzi in the Art of War”; by Richard G. Ang in “Winning 
People in Leadership Using Sun Zi’s Art of War”; by Marc Winter in “Suggestions for a Re-
Interpretation of the Concept of Wu Xing in the Sunzi bingfa, and by Sandra Wawrytko in 
“Winning Ways: The Viability (Dao) and Virtuosity (De) of Sunzi’s Methods of Warfare 
(Bingfa).” 
 Hai-Fa Sun, Chao-Chuan Chen, and Shi-He Zhang claim in “Strategic Leadership in the 
Art of War” that preconceptions of proper leadership models color Occidental interpretation of 
The Art of War’s directives. The three authors examine the qualities of effective and ineffective 
leadership in relationship to Sunzi’s teachings and explore what they call his strategic 
situationalism in light of his beliefs regarding humaneness, holism, and dialecticism in relation to 
our contemporary global situation. The authors place Sunzi in the Warring States Period, with its 
deconstruction of central government and its dependence on severe laws to maintain order. 
31 
 
 
Related to this required maintenance of order was the States’ creation of professional armies 
employing conscripted peasants who were led by elite specialists. Sun, Chen, and Zhang 
maintain that the creation of these armies was similar to the modern development of independent 
Western‒style corporations run by professional management teams.74 What is dissimilar is 
significant, however, because Sunzi’s culture constrained him with the philosophies prevalent 
during his lifetime (primarily Confucianism, Daoism, and Legalism) and from which the author 
drew to create his unique, brief, and significant text on leadership. The authors say that Sunzi 
inherently relied upon the Confucian precepts of benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety, 
and wisdom to develop his strategies, just as he assumed Daoism’s basic dialectic of yin and 
yang and the strategic use of natural elements (earth, fire, water, metal, and wood) in warfare. To 
these philosophical influences Sunzi added the Legalist concepts of law, authority, and tactics.
75
 
 To illustrate, the first Pian (chapter) in The Art of War utilizes all three philosophies to 
establish the direction of the entire work: “the Confucian Dao of benevolence, the Daoist Dao of 
dialecticism in the strategies, and the Legalistic prescriptions” for the logistics of a military 
campaign.
76
 Here Sunzi addresses the mission of war as “a matter of life and death” and the 
method of accomplishing this mission as a matter of strategy rather than direct aggression. The 
bulk of the text is the description of the strategies of organization, coordination, control, and 
motivation. The three authors find that Sunzi’s strategies are successful because of the practice 
of “strategic leadership,” a concept that reflects the “institutional perspective” of a community of 
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alliances, rather than a simple subordinate and management relationship.
77
 Although 
unacknowledged or misrepresented in much popular literature, Sunzi ‘s leadership ideal is based 
on the humanistic purpose of benevolence, “service to the community at large,” and ethical 
actions that encourage the support of the people, such as a defensive focus and a goal of winning 
over the enemy rather than seeking its annihilation.
78
 These three factors coalesce in a 
hierarchical authority that can allow the autonomy of subordinates.  The leader leads by 
encouraging those beneath him “to follow the Way (Dao) rather than the whims of the sovereign 
and by treating soldiers like parents should treat children.”79 The authors believe that Sunzi’s 
comprehensiveness (his listings throughout The Art of War) and his holistic view of the 
“constituent elements within and across systems” are the factors that allow leaders to “maximize 
and leverage” situations and “minimize the effects of constraints.”80 Moreover, this holistic 
viewpoint relates to the dialecticism of yin and yang, oppositional forces that produce all that we 
can know, including war—which Sunzi addresses with this dualistic approach: Know yourself 
and know your enemy, then strategize accordingly.
81
 Sun, Chen, and Zhang say that his 
technique is successful because “[d]ialecticism encourages holistic thinking so as to be in touch 
with the full reality, and at the same time it motivates activism and proactivity to influence and 
leverage a situation. . . .”82 Therefore, Sunzi’s leadership style is situational, influenced by 
external elements (environment or terrain) and internal elements (motivation of the troops). 
Rather than placing the burden of success upon his troops, a leader should depend, instead, on 
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his own capacity to manipulate their deployment in particularized situations. 
 The ideal leader must have the wisdom to creatively interpret situations and deploy his 
followers.  Of the five attributes that Sunzi lists for his generals, wisdom is the most prominent. 
For Sunzi, wisdom, unlike intelligence, would entail a broad knowledge of the mission of war, 
an understanding of the Dao (knowledge of both advantages and disadvantages), the recognition 
of changing situations, and the ability to manipulate and maintain the troops’ loyalty.83  On the 
other hand, there are five characteristics of a leader and/or his troops that will lead to defeat: 
Those ready to die can be killed; those afraid to die can be killed; those quick to anger can be 
shamed; those who are sanctimonious can be disgraced, and those who love people can be 
disgraced.
84
 The authors state that this list is often seen as “character flaws,” but these traits are 
actually “cognitive and emotional errors committed in response to extremely turbulent and 
volatile situations.”85 In other words, they are most likely situational characteristics, and 
therefore can be eliminated by strategic leadership with a dualistic view of aligning the 
aforementioned traits with others (for instance, courage linked to wisdom or benevolence with 
discipline) for the benefit of the collective organization.
86
 This management technique is seen by 
the authors as a potential building block in cross‒cultural management relationship and 
system‒level adaptations of business practices for the global market.87 Yet, a significant issue 
raised by their examination of strategic situationalism is determining whether it is situation or 
individualized characteristics that drive behavior. While many in the west believe that Sunzi’s 
attributes are readily applicable to capitalistic management practices, Sun, Chen, and Zhang 
                                                          
83
 Ibid., p. 159. 
84
 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Thomas Cleary (Boston: Shambhala Press, 2005), p. 114. 
85
 Sun, Chen, and Zhang, p. 160. 
86
 Ibid., p. 161. 
87
 Ibid., p. 166. 
34 
 
 
stress that strategic leadership is based on the positional advantage of terrain (di shi), the power 
of the situation, rather than the traditional reliance in Western cultures on individualized acts of 
bravery on the part of the troops.
88
 Without an understanding of the philosophies that underpin 
The Art of War, unnecessary sacrifices to gain the field of victory on the battlefield—or in the 
board room—will continue to be the trademark of Western corporate structures. 
 In contrast to Sun, Chen, and Zhang’s cautiously nuanced study, “Winning People in 
Leadership Using Sun Zi’s Art of War” by Richard G. Ang is a simplistic and culturally biased 
lesson on “How to Succeed in Business” for one newly advanced into management. Ang 
attempts to justify typical Western business leadership practices by citing Sunzi’s rules, and the 
result is quite problematic. Ang dismisses the literal meaning of “war,” as well as Sunzi’s 
mission of saving the state, and redefines the term as an individual’s “inner struggles, personal 
circumstances, conflict within an organization he or she is affiliated with, or a partnership 
conflict.” The author leaps to the conclusion that all this individualized conflict and disharmony 
must be controlled by a “steely determination to achieve victory” by employing Sunzi’s 
strategies and tactics.
89
 On one hand, Ang suggests that individuals should be left alone to do the 
tasks they were hired to do, relating to Sunzi’s directives in his third chapter, “Offensive 
Strategy.”90 On the other hand, the author undermines this dictum when he suggests to the newly 
promoted that if they do not know what they are doing to remember Sunzi’s statement that “all 
warfare is based on deception,” concluding that “when incapable, feign capacity.”91 In reality, 
Sunzi does not say this, but he does say that “[w]hen someone whose wisdom is inadequate 
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commands the army it is conceit. . . . only a general who knows the Tao is capable.”92 Although 
Ang cites this statement, he does not appear to understand it—or the magnitude of his own lack 
of cultural awareness in regard to Sunzi’s philosophical and martial preparations:  “It is advisable 
for the new leader to undergo a leadership training program,” he says [my emphasis].93 
 Another misrepresentation of Sunzi’s lessons can be found when Ang suggests that 
leaders should cultivate the semblance that employees are associates rather than subordinates.
94
 
This practice is formulated to portray equal footing and interests, and it is a common one in the 
predominantly democratic West since the early 1970’s, but it is not representative of Sunzi’s 
commanding leadership philosophy.
95
 Ang also informs the reader that spending quality time 
with underlings will instill loyalty, ludicrously citing Sunzi: “[the leader] treats [his followers] as 
his own beloved sons and they will stand by him unto death.”96 Is there any employee who 
would follow his boss into a life or death battle because they have chatted about the previous 
weekend’s activities? What Ang does convey effectively is the necessity of a new leader to 
accomplish his goals. To do so, he or she must ensure the loyalty of those who will be doing all 
the work. Unfortunately for his claim of innovative discovery, his common Western leadership 
philosophy is more apparent than is Sunzi’s: “Let [the subordinates] do the legwork and be at the 
background. If something goes wrong, they are blamed. If everything goes well, the leader gets 
the credit. So a good leader should be visible but uninvolved.”97 But in actuality, Sunzi says just 
the opposite—a leader at times must “feign inactivity [my emphasis].”98 
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 Should the newly appointed leader find enemies in his organization, those who are 
disgruntled and who are adversarial to his or her leadership (not Sunzi’s enemy to the survival of 
the state), Ang suggests either democratically inspired participative administration to encourage 
compliance or the undermining of the dissidents in the eyes of other employees. And if those 
tactics do not achieve victory, one should confuse the enemy by “treating him with benevolence” 
to throw him off track, as if Sunzi’s understanding of “benevolence” was like a poison ivy 
ointment to be applied or merely a polite interchange at the coffee shop. To complete his 
subversion of Sunzi’s philosophy, Ang  further states,  “If one cannot have a head on [sic] 
collision with the ‘enemy,’ then killing him softly with kindness is the next best alternative 
[emphasis mine]”—a statement which circumscribes Sunzi’s ultimate victory—survival through 
non-engagement with enemy forces. 
99
 
 The author unintentionally does come to the justifiable conclusion that in our postmodern 
world, “very different from the China of old,” Sunzi’s teaching remains relevant. Unfortunately, 
Ang does not appear to have a very sophisticated understanding of The Art of War. Moreover, he 
has superficially applied its teachings to justify common, staid management practices in the west. 
And although he advises the new leader to learn his or her corporation’s history, Ang has failed 
to understand that “the China of old” and its philosophies relating to Sunzi’s lessons are the only 
reasons that The Art of War can be looked upon as a viable resource for leadership today.
100
 
 Ang’s superficial, spray‒painted application of The Art of War to disguise an unattractive 
business model is quite the opposite of Marc Winter’s fine brush stroke in his “Suggestions for a 
Re-Interpretation of the Concept of Wu xing in Sunzi binga.” Winter’s examination of a singular 
term serves to demonstrate why historical context is of paramount importance to understanding 
                                                          
99
 Ang., p. 339. 
100
 Ibid., p. 441. 
37 
 
 
Sunzi and why even those with extensive knowledge about his text may misunderstand The Art 
of War’s philosophy and message. Through the ages, arguments about the date of composition, 
authorship, or style have multiplied and access to intellectual concepts from feudal societies and 
the Imperial age have not been readily available until relatively recent archeological findings. 
More often than not, scholars focused on the conspicuous for examination or research—such as 
terms or phrases that could have appeared only during particular eras—and this knowledge has 
created controversial theories that may become traditional ones, such as Robin Yates’s beliefs 
that editors or copyists edited The Art of War to fit the aesthetic ideal of their times or that the 
text is a result of additions from different centuries.
101
  Because he also calls for a re-evaluation 
of  the ancient text outside of its “pre-established intellectual categories” in order to see beyond 
what others have already seen, 
102
 Winter’s study relates to Sun, Chen, and Zhang’s calling for 
reconceptualization based on Sunzi’s philosophy because both arguments have a practical 
application for today’s scholars and business leaders. 
 Winter’s argument is that The Art of War is a coherent text created by one author, and his 
evidence lies in the etymology of wuxing. The term is typically interpreted and translated to 
mean “five phases” with an attendant meaning of cosmological interaction between heaven and 
earth and with the sense of “overcoming versus coming forth (shen vs. sheng).”103 Winter 
challenges this notion by citing a study by Christopher Rand who finds that it was not until after 
the third century B.C.E. in China that man and cosmos were believed to be directly connected. 
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Therefore, Winter claims that Sunzi was speaking metaphorically of the five known planets “as 
mere images to illustrate and exemplify his rational arguments in regard to constant change.”104 
Winter cites A. C. Graham who states that such correlative thought was part of a tradition of 
metaphorizing in “non-philosophical texts”—texts, which Winter notes, were written and used 
by technical specialists such as astronomers or physicians to illustrate their ideas (which Winter 
says is the same technique found in The Art of War).
105
 Winter also cites John Major who 
believes the planets referred to the gods in the Chinese “Grand Origin Myth,” and that these 
“cosmic paradigms [were] abstracted into a philosophical principle (wu hsing), during the 
Warring States Period (480‒221 B.C.E.).106 Afterward, cosmological correlation became more 
and more prevalent, from the Yellow Emperor’s medical treatises (Huangdi neijing) to the 
pentatonic scale, and at the end of the period, Zou Yan’s politicization of wuxing by equating the 
phases with dynasties and their legitimacy (or lack thereof).
107
 
 Winter’s claim that, to Sunzi, wuxing meant “five planets” decontructs the term’s 
anachronistic association to the cosmological stance that observations in nature are parallel to 
human experience and understanding. Unlike the diurnal “patterns” of the sun, during Sunzi’s 
lifetime, the planets did not appear to have a particular pattern, so the five planets became his 
metaphor of constant change.
108
 The summation of Sunzi’s famous water metaphor concerning 
form and military engagement relates to the necessity of adaptation to the constant unknown: 
“He, who can modify his tactics in relation to his opponent and thereby succeed in winning, may 
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be called a heaven‒born captain. Therefore: among the Five planets none is ahead of the others 
always. . . .”109 
 The colors of these planets eventually became associated with “five elements” on earth; 
and in association, eventually the misinterpretation of “five phases” of change for “five planets” 
became codified in The Art of War scholarship. But Winter says the five‒phase model of 
correlative connections did not develop until after Warring States.
110
 To Sunzi, the five planets, 
tastes, sounds, or colors were examples of the ways a limited number of elements could be 
combined to create numerous varieties or opportunities for success. Likewise, Winter’s 
examination of only one term suggests that The Art of War studies offer numerous opportunities 
for philosophical and historical inquiry. Even with ancient or modern misconceptions 
superimposed on the text, sinologists may utilize the twenty‒first century’s international focus 
on it to create knowledge that could promote practical and ethical applications of successful 
global leadership practices.          
 Like Winter’s particularized study, Sandra Wawrytko’s “Winning Ways: The Viability 
(Dao) and Virtuosity (De) of Sunzi’s Methods of Warfare (Bingfa)” challenges common notions 
about The Art of War, especially Western conceptions of Chinese culture as being warlike and 
war loving, as Richard G. Ang implies (above). Instead, Wawrytko claims that Sunzi was a 
“proponent of peace” and that many of those who share Ang’s viewpoint of Chinese culture have 
been influenced by an uninformed analysis of The Art of War, based on a misconception of the 
term “art” being assumed to mean a created beauty. Instead fa is closer in meaning to “law” or 
“method,” and closer to a derivative of ars, a skill, which, according to Sunzi, should be used 
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with much care and foresight.
111
  The original meaning most likely was not lost on the The Art of 
War French Jesuit translator in 1772,
112
 but few who have read the English version today 
understand the subtleties of the title, easily comparing it with Westerner Niccolo Machiavelli’s 
famous conceptual treatise, Art of War.        
 This misalignment of meaning came naturally to a culture that would typically have little 
awareness of Daoism, a philosophy, Wawrytko says, which underscores Sunzi’s own beliefs 
about casualties and warfare. Although her study focuses on pervasive militarism in Western 
culture, her work has implications for business practices, which are often modeled on military 
constructs. The author acknowledges scholars who have already examined Western 
misrepresentations of The Art of War and who have concluded that Sunzi’s teachings have been 
“manipulated to suit the biases of [any] interpreter,” who wished to succeed at any cost.113  
Instead, Wawrytko studies the philosophical underpinning of The Art of War to better understand 
this Occidental manipulation of meaning. She concludes that Sunzi’s “philosophy constitutes an 
Applied Daoism.
114
 The author categorizes Sunzi’s positive Daoist traits, such as his agenda for 
stemming the proliferation of armed conflict “without succumbing to bu wei pacificism,” and his 
weaker or less developed characteristics, such as his inferior virtuosity (de)—due to his reliance 
on foreknowledge as a form of cunning intellect (zhihui), on human nature instead of the 
expansiveness of nature (ziran) that dao emulates, and on human artifice.
115
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 This applied philosophy directly relates to one of the most often quoted sections of The 
Art of War: “Warfare is the Tao of deception.”116 Both Sunzi and Laozi, author of the Daodejing, 
recognize that most individuals tend to live in a shallow reality, rarely looking below the surface 
for profound insights about their lives. And Sunzi utilizes—or applies—this human inclination to 
misdirect the enemy for his followers’ own survival. Because of the magnitude of this duty, the 
commander is the champion (fu) of his followers,
117
 placing himself between danger to the State 
and the State, necessitating his possession of specific qualities associated with Daoist beliefs: 
wisdom (zhi), trustworthiness (xin), humaneness (ren), courage (yong), conscientiousness (yan), 
and the “dao of management” (fa),118 as well as the discernment to ignore political directives that 
would undermine the survival of the State.
119
 
 Warwrytko explains that Sunzi assesses the strengths of his opponents according to 
categories relating to his strategy for survival: community commitment (dao), climate (tian), 
terrain (di), leadership (jiang), and methodology (fa). Of these strategic factors, dao is the most 
significant, but it has been misinterpreted as “moral cause or moral law,” she says. In the life and 
death battle for which Sunzi prepares, the dao is synonymous with a high level of morale, which 
elicits the leader’s identical commitment from the people—so much so that they do not fear 
death when bound to this common cause. This capacity to move beyond individual interest is 
related to why Ang’s facile applications of the ideals of The Art of War to the Western 
competitive managerial environment fail to provide innovative leadership practices. In fact, one 
of the most significant points that Warwrytko makes in relation to business practices is that the 
idea of competition, so acculturated in Western minds, is found in neither Daoism nor The Art of 
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War: “The Sage’s Dao accomplishes without competing,” says Laozi—and is accomplished by 
Sunzi’s ideal leader’s wu wei victory.120 (Although Ang equates wu wei to “inaction,” the author 
uses Roger T. Ames’s translation: “nonassertive or noncoercive action.”121) 
 Warwrytko explains that the Daodejing teaches that “[t]hose who covet the state cannot 
protect it and are doomed to failure” and that “[t]he intrusive behavior of the elite makes people 
‘difficult to rule.’”122 In other words, those who compete in order to control others for their 
individualized interests cannot be bound to a communal mission or elicit the high morale of 
subordinates. Unlike Sunzi, such leaders do not value the lives of those whom they seek to 
control but see them as expendable commodities to be used to gain ever more power and 
“commodities.” 
 Wawrytko believes that due to their selfish fetish for conspicuous consumption, 
Westerners do not take death seriously, even in their increasingly precious leisure time playing 
costly videogames that “ever escalate death and destruction.”123 Nevertheless, the author is 
hopeful that Sunzi’s philosophy and methodology can be utilized by leaders from the west to 
seriously reevaluate their definitions of “success,” as well as the practices that achieve it. Besides 
her discussion concerning the necessity for a leader to inspire a high level of morale in his 
subordinates, in regard to limiting liabilities in a life or death struggle, the author stresses the 
necessity for leaders to possess the traits (mentioned earlier) of wisdom (zhi), trustworthiness 
(xin), humaneness (ren) courage, (yong), conscientiousness (yan), and skill (fa)
124
 However, each 
of these characteristics must be developed individually and honed throughout a lifetime. None of 
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them can be learned in a training seminar as Ang suggests, and all of them relate to what many 
Westerners incorrectly already believe constitutes a significant portion of their identities, without 
having earnestly cultivated these traits. This is true most likely because they are too busy trying 
to fulfill their societies’ expectations for and definitions of success—a pursuit, at present, 
designed as a “lose‒lose” situation for the majority. Business leaders often mimic the intensity of 
the battlefield to promote competition and incentive, and because capitalism is the underpinning 
of most Western countries, everyone within these societies is affected. 
 Unfortunately Warwrytko fails to acknowledge that a vacuum exists where Westerners 
should find the introspection and awareness required to find the Way. The vessel has been 
depleted as a result of the decreasing rewards for popularly degraded analytical and intellectual 
pursuits and the increasing status of those who embrace readily available, comfortable, and 
acceptable anti-intellectual activities. Western culture in general denies the cerebral and glorifies 
and celebrates competition—with the result that too few individuals realize that “Mission 
Accomplished!” banners are inappropriate because, as Sunzi says, “war is to be treated as a 
funeral rite / After multitudes have been slaughtered.”125 Competition and militarism are 
embedded into the Western world view. 
 Can Sunzi’s text be helpful to Western leaders who seem oblivious to seeing themselves 
as others see them or who seek strategies that can be easily downloaded into an outdated “How 
to Succeed in Business” manual? Warwrytko finds that The Art of War’s directives accomplish 
their goals as long as leadership has a grasp of its underlying premises. Her work offers insight 
into the Chinese culture as one that would pursue a harsh military option as a last resort, rather 
than as having a brash, imperious marshal constitution that popular interpretations of Sunzi’s 
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work have established. The Western workforce may not have spent years cultivating the Daoist 
characteristics she believes to be the key to success, but if it is encouraged to read her study, it 
would be an excellent beginning to develop understanding that can lead eventually to innovative 
business strategies. 
 Such innovation is needed because the global market is a reality, along with its mega-
corporations competing for market dominance. Will they prove Karl Marx right? Will capitalism 
collapse upon itself as large, wealthy corporations grow ever more powerful and wealthy—
eventually demoting middle‒class small business owners to one powerful and disgruntled 
working class of subordinates? We have the borderless opportunity as historians to examine the 
nuances of The Art of War and to explain them to those who need to hear them—a win‒win 
situation. Therefore in my next chapter, I will discuss the philosophical connections between The 
Art of War and The Romance of the Three Kingdoms, a classic Oriental text with increasingly 
popular appeal to the Occidental world, and provide episodic illustrations as a means to a re-
vision of Western interpretations of the popular historical novel.
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Chapter III 
“To Serve the State and Save the People
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Luo Guanzhong’s The Romance of the Three Kingdoms is an increasingly popular  
book in the twenty‒first century, in part because the work relates to modern strategic  
leadership, Chinese culture, and military engagement. Because of its martial context, the work 
seems to embody the tactics found in Sunzi’s The Art of War. To understand both works and the 
culture that produced them—and that continues to be influenced by the philosophies represented 
in them—it is helpful to examine the concept of benevolence, a significant philosophical 
connection between The Art of War and The Romance of the Three Kingdoms that serves to 
illustrate the Dao of administration necessary for successful leadership and for the survival of the 
state.  
Winning Hearts 
 As mentioned in Chapter II, Hai-Fa Sun, Chao-chuan Chen, and She-He Zhang claim that 
Sunzi himself was a product of three philosophies—“the Confucian Dao of benevolence, the 
Daoist Dao of dialecticism (yin and yang) in the strategies, and the Legalistic prescriptions for 
the logistics of a military campaign.”126 In other words, the philosophies harmoniously coexist 
for Sunzi in what the three call situational Daoism, which relates to a strategic leadership 
dependant on a community of alliances rather than simple hierarchal relationships.
127
 (See 
Chapter II and below.)                          
 Sunzi’s primary focus is to save the state from destruction, and, in order to do this, he 
must be the type of leader the troops will trust to avoid unnecessary carnage and will follow into 
battle. This warrior knows that it is of utmost importance to “[establish] a mutual relationship 
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with the people.”128 To accomplish this, he knows that a great leader must win the hearts of his 
followers prior to stepping onto a field of battle. Of the factors that he says are necessary to win 
battles, the great leader must possess the most significant one, the balance of the Dao. With this 
connection with the cosmos, one will have the advantages of “heaven and earth” and model 
benevolence, a characteristic that relates directly to the other four factors: wisdom, credibility, 
courage, and strictness. It is benevolence, the human factor, which separates and defines The 
Romance of the Three Kingdom’s Liu Bei and Cao Cao.  
 Benevolence has been defined as being “a man’s whole hearted and joyful concern for 
other men, his delight in their good fortune and dislike of their misfortune.”129 With this attitude, 
Sunzi knows that the people will “die with him; they will live with him and not fear danger.”130 
Sunzi maintains this reverence by keeping his focus on his goal, the survival of the state, rather 
than on his own reputation: “[A general] who does not advance to seek fame, nor [fail to retreat] 
to avoid [being charged with the capital] offense of retreating, but seeks only to preserve the 
people and gain advantage for the ruler is the state’s treasure.”131 This ideal leader achieves the 
balance he seeks, and with this in mind, one can be—and can expect his followers to be—wise, 
credible, courageous, and strict because “[w]hen the general regards his troops as young 
children, they will advance into the deepest valleys with him. When he regards the troops as his 
beloved children, they will be willing to die with him.”132 
 This is not to say that he expects to cater to these children; rather he is the firm, strict, and 
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loving parent who expects them to live up to his high expectations of them. To influence them, 
the balance of the Dao is necessary to win the hearts of his followers and to achieve the benefits 
of benevolence within his alliances, his simulated family, in order to achieve victory through 
what Sunzi calls the Dao of administration.
133
 
Benevolence 
 Luo Guanzhong’s The Romance of the Three Kingdoms contrasts Liu Bei’s humane 
benevolence with Cao Cao’s lack of it. As with The Art of War, the episodes do revolve around 
winning and losing, and Sunzi’s presence and benevolence—like a defining ideogram—pervade 
the epic. Liu Bei is the embodiment of Sunzi’s factor of benevolence and his focus on winning 
the enemy over to his side rather than seeking its annihilation.
134
  
 One example of the avoidance of bloodshed is found when Liu Bei’s most favored 
advisor, Zhuge Liang, desperate for weapons going into a battle, follows his leader’s 
methodology. Instead of initiating a bloody skirmish, he gains the necessary arrows by tricking 
Cao Cao’s men through subterfuge. While Liu Bei’s men sound their battle drums and run on 
their side of the river bank in a fog, they control a boat that holds a dummy at which Cao Cao’s 
men shoot their arrows through the fog bank. Of course, Liu Bei’s men gather up these weapons. 
Later, Lu Su asks him how he knew there would be fog, and Zhuge Liang responds as his 
superior would have—that it is a benevolent leader’s responsibility to know about the terrain in 
order to strategically avoid direct combat and the unnecessary deaths of his followers (Chapter 
30). According to Sunzi: 
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A military commander is a mediocrity, unless he is versed in the patterns 
of the heavens, recognizes the advantages of the terrain, knows the 
interaction of prognostic signs, understands the changes in weather, 
examines the map of deployment, and is clear about the balance of 
forces.
135
 
Moreover, as does Sunzi, Liu Bei relies on strategic leadership that “reflects the ‘institutional 
perspective of a community of alliances, rather than a simple subordinate and management 
relationship.”136 They both create a simulated familial relationship (as described earlier). Both 
Sunzi and Liu Bei highly honor this filial connection and win the people’s support because of 
their ethical actions. This connection to their followers relates directly to their high priority for 
wu wei, the attainment of non-attainment—rejecting activity that is contrary to nature rather than 
through status or authority, and thus their high regard for strategies that avoid bloodshed.
137
 
 It is not only winning or losing but also Liu Bei’s benevolence that is central to Luo’s 
historical fiction. Luo illustrates this concept at the onset of the epic in Liu Bei’s battling the 
Yellow Scarves in his desire to maintain the status quo of the state in order to retain good fortune 
for its people.
138
 Liu Bei’s actions reveal him to be in a cycle that eventually lifts him to great 
political height. He appears to have the Mandate of Heaven through his benevolent capacities, 
and his intent of holding his (eventual) kingdom in place is not related to political promotion but 
to a sacred trust to save the state and serve the people.       
 Therefore, the Peach Garden pact (which begins The Romance of the Three Kingdoms 
and the brotherhood that the story revolves around) is sealed with a ritual and oath, aligning the 
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brothers in arms in a holy, cosmic compact.
139
 This compact represents a “deliberate tradition” of 
ethical and religious precepts that create a “socio-political cohesion for a society that ha[s] grown 
complex.”140 Liu Bei’s charge as a leader is to protect this tradition and to be the representation 
of the cosmic connection between his followers and nature and Heaven.  
 In order to live up to this requirement, the leader has to be pure and righteous and be, as 
Sunzi says, a benevolent “example to the common people. They, in turn, [will imitate his] virtues 
by their own initiative and not by governmental force. Then there would be harmony among 
men. . . .”141 The benevolence found in the following example from Chapter 41 illustrates 
conduct to be imitated: 
A scout reported: “Cao Cao’s main force is camped at Fan. They’re 
gathering boats and rafts to cross over here today.” “We can defend 
ourselves from Jiangling,” the commanders assured [Liu Bei], “but with 
such a multitude on our hands we’re barely covering ten li a day. Who 
knows when we will make Jiangling? ….Wouldn’t it be expedient to leave 
the people behind for now and go on ahead ourselves?” [Liu Bei] replie[s] 
with deep feeling, “The human factor is the key to any undertaking.  How 
can we abandon those who have committed themselves to us?”142  
His humane connection to his men shows him to be benevolently caring for their welfare, rather 
than merely calculating plans to use them. And without understanding what is common to human 
beings, one cannot lead or defeat them. As mentioned before, Liu Bei is living in a time of great 
upheaval, and this leader struggles against defeat and to maintain power. He must serve with 
righteousness, which forces him to deal with the human factor—unlike Cao Cao who appears to 
calculate and win by making decisions with a strategically precise, fine edge of a sword. 
 For instance in Chapter 84, Liu Bei hesitates to take advantage of a weaker statesman 
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when advisor Pang Tong urges Liu Bei to kill Lu Bu to gain his Shu territory. But Liu Bei 
refuses, not once but—twice, saving Lu Bu’s life. Liu Bei refuses to act with less than the 
highest degree of humanity and benevolence in this situation, saying: “I will not establish myself 
by such means. . . Lu Bu and I are of the same house and I would shudder at harming him.”143 
And when his own followers attempt to assassinate Lu Bu, Liu Bei stands by his principles 
warning, “Let each throw down his sword blade or die” (Chapter 60).144 (Most likely, this 
rejection of his advice alienates Pang Tong (in the fictional account) who eventually follows Cao 
Cao who is more appreciative than Liu Bei of his intuitive judgment about dealing with the 
enemy.)            
 Time and time again, such actions reveal Liu Bei’s inherent goodness as he proves 
himself a great leader, putting the welfare of the people over his own. According to Antonio 
Carmone: “[A]ctions that are taken by Liu Bei . . . are almost always performed from standpoints 
of virtue which are reflective of Liu Bei’s own benevolence.”145 For instance, when his people 
are in danger of being overtaken by Cao Cao’s army, Liu Bei leads them away from the attack. 
He, by himself, could have gotten away after a portent (a swirling dust cloud that darkens the sun 
momentarily) warns that he must flee—according to one of his men:  “Abandon these people 
with all speed and be gone” was the advice. True to his character, Liu Bei’s responds: “They 
have followed from as far as Xinye . . . . I cannot abandon them.”146 He has the courage of his 
convictions for “[r]ighteousness is the accordance of actions with what is right. . . .147 Instead of 
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escaping, he takes direct action—leading 2000 of his men to meet his opponents in order allow 
the rest of his people time to move to safety” (Chapter 41).148 Nevertheless, his benevolence does 
not save them because the majority falls into Cao Cao’s hands. 
 And although his strategy is not always successful, it is his benevolence, as with Sunzi’s, 
that draws those who are virtuous and hold to tradition to serve him militarily, like Zhao Yun, 
Ma Chao and Chan Wei
149
 or like his Peach Garden brothers Zhang Fei and Guan Yu who 
pledge to dedicate themselves to serving the people and the state in Chapter 1.
150
 These men 
honor and recognize all that Liu Bei stands for. For example, Zhao Yun had served Yuan Shao 
but found that he was careless about the welfare of the people and disloyal to his prince. Liu 
Bei’s sense of humanity and leadership—benevolence—brings this officer into his ranks. Even 
though Liu Bei’s forces are weak at the time, Chao Yun prefers to serve a man who is sincere 
and righteous. Similarly in Chapter 8, Zhuge Liang is moved by Liu Bei and chooses to follow 
this leader. 
Zhuge Liang] replied, “I have long been happy on my farm and am fond 
of my leisure. I fear I cannot obey your command.  [Liu Bei] wept. “If you 
will not, O Master, what will become of the people?”  The tears rolled 
down unchecked upon the lapel and sleeves of his robe. This proved to 
[Zhuge Liang] the sincerity of his desire and he said, “General, if you will 
accept me, I will render what trifling service I can.”151 
Despite these examples that prove his obviously benevolent wish for the welfare of his people; 
despite Liu Bei’s development of the Kingdom of Shu, and despite his drawing good leaders to 
follow him, he does not attain balance—Sunzi’s Dao of administration. Liu Bei fails in the end.  
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Non Benevolence 
 Though not among those sworn in the sacred pact to uphold the Mandate of Heaven and 
the state in the Peach Garden pact, Cao Cao also claims that his war against his rivals for power 
is to “rescue the state.” He attempts to give the impression that he is operating under the laws of 
propriety in order to win followers because he needs to simulate a sacred purpose (like the pact 
in the Peach Garden) in order to convince the people of his mandate to rule. In reality, Cao Cao 
does not seek the mandate but seeks the power to create it, and benevolence is not a key factor to 
his success.           
 He is successful because people recognize his power to lead. Similar to Sunzi and Liu Bei 
who form their community of alliances to maintain relationships with their followers, Cao Cao 
forms a bond with his people. However, his connection is not a spiritual one based on traditional 
precepts. Instead, he establishes military agricultural colonies—giving peasants (who had 
suffered from the destruction of their territories) land that had been abandoned in the war. The 
land is controlled by Cao Cao’s government, and for the first time in their memories, the 
peasants are not under the power of their former landlords. These grateful subjects grow supplies 
and defend their plots.
152
 His is not the model spiritual connection to the cosmos as Liu Bei’s is, 
but instead, Cao Cao models Sunzi’s practical call for provisions to be on hand locally, rather 
than transporting them to the battle field, to gain advantage for victory.
153
   
 Cultivating advantage is Cao Cao’s forte. He is not from the royal line—his father being 
the adopted son of a eunuch at court. And as his father had, Cao Cao gains promotion into the 
middle ranks—until the civil war. At this juncture in Chapter 10, Cao Cao thrives during the 
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destruction of established authority. He “[picks] the finest of the [defeated] Yellow Scarves 
troops and [organizes] them into the Qingzhou army. . . . In consequence, Cao Cao’s prestige 
[rises] steadily. . . .”154 But regardless of his manipulations to prove otherwise, he is typically 
remembered as being less virtuous or esteemed than Liu Bei. According to Rafe De Crespigny, 
this attitude seems to derive from Cao Cao’s inability to destroy his chief rivals, and, even 
though he “restored government in the heart land of China,” the state he founded was later 
destroyed.
155
 Luo Guanzhong himself chooses to reiterate this sense of failure by quoting “a poet 
of later time” who reveals the common, negative attitude toward Cao Cao’s reputation: “Cao Cao 
in all his vaunted cunning, / Slew his hosts and kept on running. . . .” (Chapter 11).156 
 Moreover, Luo’s readers see that Cao Cao’s rituals attempt to hide his ambitions and that 
his long‒winded speeches are full of insincerity. He does anything to win, and in comparison 
with Liu Bei, his lack of focus on the quality of benevolence seems to prove him to be the lesser 
man. Yet, he, too, partially embodies Sunzi’s ideal leader: 
Because Cao Cao comes from the lower gentry, he must have charismatic 
identity to maintain his control, and such an identity is achieved with his 
capacity to attract and hold men in service and support in battle. Cao Cao 
is a flamboyant, arrogant, luxurious, quick-witted, and frequently brutal 
personality.
157
 
Regardless of the tactics he uses to get to the top and to stay there, this non-benevolent 
leader knows his followers’ expectations and pretends to be pure in intention in order to become 
or remain their leader and to be their connection to heaven—the Son of Heaven. Cao Cao knows 
that what Confucius says is true: “If the people have no faith in their rulers, there is no standing 
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for the State.”158          
 He creates this faith in his own fashion. From training farmers who have never had 
military training to promoting those who had experience in the old imperial army, Cao Cao 
successfully uses Sunzi’s reward system: “. . . what motivates men to slay the enemy is anger; 
what stimulates them to seize profits from the enemy is material goods. . . . . Treat the captured 
soldiers well in order to nurture them [for our use].
159
 The significance of this tactic is that it has 
no connection with the factor of benevolence, and yet, for Cao Cao, the tactic brings him ever 
closer to the possession of power, his proof of the mandate. 
 An example of Cao Cao’s lack of benevolence can be found when Mi Heng’s strips 
naked in Cao Cao’s presence. Mi Heng declares Cao Cao’s corrupt nature—his inability to chant 
the odes (See Chapter IV.) or to recognize the difference between “the able and the corrupt, [his 
habit of holding] men in . . . contempt and [his ability to believe] that he can become the leader 
of the lords of the realm.”160 His criticisms seem to come from Cao Cao’s lack of reverence for 
tradition. Ironically, Cao Cao actually recruited poets—“Masters of the Jianan Peiod” who 
“[restore] the voices of individuals” whose past had collapsed due to the war.161 Their focus on 
the individual reflects Cao Cao’s own individual talent that allows him to rise to the heights that 
he does. It is not morality but ability that leads Cao Cao to victory.  
 Another example of Cao Cao’s lack of benevolence can be found even in his personal 
relationships. He does not share the same sense of connection that Liu Bei does with those he is 
close to. When Cao Cao sends one of his own sons, Cao Zhang, into battle in Chapter 16, he tells 
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him, “At home we are father and son, but when a task is given you have to consider your duty as 
a servant of your ruler. The law knows no kindness, and you must beware.”162 Cao Cao is 
relentless in achieving victory and in his determination is to remain alive to achieve it. This 
attitude enables him to win regardless of the cost and to rule with impunity. Power is his driving 
force. In Cao Cao, one finds Sunzi’s call for strict rules for the troops and fair rewards and 
punishments, aligned with his ideal leadership qualities mentioned earlier: wisdom, credibility, 
courage, and strictness—minus benevolence. And there is no sense that Cao Cao thinks upon his 
followers as parents would their children, as Sunzi and Liu Bei do. And yet he is victorious, 
while Liu Bei fails, because his use of force and fear appeal to men of the Han in a way that 
morality cannot.
163
   
Emotion versus Victory 
 The contrast between the legitimately benevolent—all actions purposefully working for 
the good of the people—and the passionate, self-serving actions of Cao Cao is crucial to 
understanding why Liu Bei never attains the Mandate of Heaven. Liu Bei’s insistence on 
responding with benevolence regardless of the situation is not always appropriate for the leader 
(great as opposed to small appropriateness as discussed in Chapter I), and when he does react 
with passion, he ends up irrationally and foolishly seeking revenge against Sun Quan for the 
death in battle of Guan Yu, his Peach Garden brother.
164
 (See further discussion in Chapter IV.) 
Luo portrays Liu Bei as completely bypassing Sunzi’s admonition for restraint: “Whoever awaits 
his enemy is at ease and whoever has to rush into conflict will be fatigued.”165 Liu Bei’s reaction 
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reveals him to be in one of five categories to avoid, according to The Art of War: “The general, 
unable to control his irritation, will launch his men to the assault like swarming ants, with the 
result that one-third of his men are slain, while the town still remains untaken. . . .
166
  
 Until this episode, Liu Bei has maintained a defensive focus rather than seeking to 
annihilate his enemies as Cao Cao often strategically does, and he has encouraged the support of 
the people through his humanistic purposes and moral influence. But regardless of his 
benevolence, in the end, Liu Bei is an example of a leader who cannot achieve the Dao of 
administration because he is rigid in his outlook and does not readily adapt to the situation at 
hand.  
 Both extremes, benevolence and its complete opposite, are prey to emotion. However, 
Cao Cao never alters his agenda due to his own passion and actually uses the passions of others 
against them, a strategy that Sunzi suggests in The Art of War, so his success is not a surprise. 
His non benevolent actions help him win his cause. On the other hand, even when Liu Bei does 
not react in anger, his benevolent attitude fails him over time. He cannot adapt to circumstance as 
Cao Cao does throughout the story. In the end, Liu Bei finally has to understand what Cao Cao 
knows and what Pang Tong had once told him when discussing the tactics necessary to secure 
the state: 
My lord’s words are quite in accord with abstract rectitude, but such ideas 
scarcely suit the days of rebellion. There are other ways of fighting than 
with warlike weapons, but to adhere too obstinate to the idea of abstract 
rectitude is to do nothing. . . . . Remember if you do not take it now 
another will.
167
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Benevolence (and its associated reverence for the human factor) is a significant 
characteristic of Sunzi’s successful leader, but it is only part of a whole person whose purpose is 
to save the state. Regardless of the circumstances, this one characteristic is the main thrust of Liu 
Bei’s leadership and proves to be an inadequate one in time of war during Han. And although 
Cao Cao lacks benevolence, he appears to be closer to achieving the Dao of administration, at 
least during times of state emergency. Luo Guanzhong’s opposing characterizations of Liu Bei 
and Cao Cao in The Romance of the Three Kingdoms reflect Sunzi’s ideal leader found in The 
Art of War to be one who understands that “[w]arfare is the greatest affair of the state, the basis 
of life and death, the Way (Tao) to survival or extinction.”168 
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Chapter IV 
The Mandate of Heaven
60 
 
 
In The Romance of the Three Kingdoms, leaders know the value of having the Mandate of 
Heaven or at least the appearance of having it to win the hearts of their followers. Those who 
believe in the moral agency of the Mandate of Heaven (Tian ming) look for one person to be 
chosen by Heaven to represent its cosmic order because his virtue legitimates the Mandate.
169
 
Throughout the novel, Liu Bei appears to be the benevolent leader, and thus the person who shall 
receive the Mandate. Conversely, Cao Cao tries to exhibit the Mandate of Heaven, when, in 
actuality, his goal is the mandate of power. Yet, neither is likely to be an ideal leader according 
to Sunzi’s The Art of War because, in fact, both focus on their own personal advantage, unlike 
Sunzi’s role model who serves the state and does not depend on the Mandate of Heaven to 
rule.
170
  
Tian ming           
 After the overthrow of the Shang Dynasty (around 1040 B.C.E.), the Zhou Dynasty came 
to power, at which time the ultimate cosmic authority came to be known as Tian,
171
 translated as 
“heaven.” Beginning with the Zhou, it claimed that only those who receive the Mandate of 
Heaven could rule China, and those with the Mandate are called the Sons of Heaven (Tian zi).
172
   
With the collapse of the Western Zhou, independent states emerged and competed with 
each other, and it became impossible for any of their multiple leaders to claim the Mandate. 
Regardless of its return to one universal leader, the establishment of the Qin Dynasty (221 
B.C.E.) did not reinstate the worship of Tian ming, Mandate of Heaven—causing Confucians to 
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yearn for the days of the benevolent rule of Zhou emperors.
173
 But even traditionally the 
Mandate could be lost by the misconduct of a ruler, as Michael Loewe remarks: 
This principal was applied anachronistically to legitimize the means 
whereby the Shang house had displaced that of the Xia, and the kings of 
the Zhou those of the Shang; for Jie and Zhou, the last rulers of Xia and 
Shang, had shown themselves to be oppressive tyrants who had flouted 
Heaven’s will [sic].174 
When the Han emperors turned to this principal for the justification of exercising their 
sovereignty, it became the foundation of Han authority when “[t]he deliberate manipulation of 
tradition for political ends [was] practiced.”175 For the elites, at least, Heaven worship, the 
official religion of the Han, was little more than “sovereignty‒validating ceremonies,” which had 
little to do with actual spiritual belief or engagement.
176
      
 Nevertheless, the commoners believed in and benefitted from this imperial ritual. With 
the promise of order inherently tied to Heaven’s Mandate, the state religion, although contrived 
during Han, created a sense of security and survival during catastrophic natural events.
177
 A 
variety of factions arose in relation to the adaptations to the “Mandate of Heaven.” For instance, 
the shift was profound from the traditional Confucian ideal of the leader being the embodiment 
of Heaven to Mencius’s later alternative Confucian stance that one can actually know who has 
been appointed by heaven because “Heaven looks through the eyes of our people.”178 For the 
Han, the people’s opinion was the mandate, and in The Romance of the Three Kingdoms, we see 
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these conflicting views play out.  
Sunzi            
 With Sunzi, philosophy broke from the traditional concepts of leadership and the 
necessity of receiving the Mandate. No great state, according to Sunzi, can depend on the 
Mandate of Heaven to maintain security.
179
 Instead, this alleged pretense of Heaven can be 
undermined by those, like Cao Cao, who have the capacity to attack either a complaisant or 
spiritually confident army. Sunzi says that what others believe to be unassailable can be defeated 
if a leader has faith in himself rather than in the Mandate.—“Have faith in yourself [my 
emphasis], apply your awesomeness to the enemy. Then his cities can be taken, his state can be 
subjugated.”180 And yet Sunzi’s statement is not a call for self-aggrandizement: he defines 
warfare as the promotion of the state for the sake of the people. As he says, “[an ideal general] 
does not advance to seek fame, nor [fail to retreat] to avoid [being charged with the capital] 
offense of retreating, but seeks only to preserve the people and gain advantage.
181
   
 Such a leader will have the confidence to seek information rather than await Heaven’s 
portents to gain advantage. Advanced knowledge, an awareness that stems from careful, studious 
evaluation, is what produces victory: this competence “cannot be gained from ghosts and spirits, 
inferred from phenomena, or projected from the measures of Heaven, but must be gained from 
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men for they have the knowledge of the enemy’s true situation.”182   
 Thus this sense of awareness is created in one who makes it his responsibility to know 
men well, not their interaction with the cosmos but their interactions with one another. This 
knowledge of others enables the great leader to “forge . . . preparatory alliances.”183 This rational 
capacity to know others is indicative of a key component for a successful leader. Knowing 
himself through the flaws and virtues he recognizes in others will serve him well. Such a leader 
has the advantage of understanding the very people he would lead: “[I]f you know them and 
know yourself, your victory will not be imperiled,” he says.184 
Yet this quality cannot be reciprocal because the great leader “stupefies the eyes and ears 
of the officers and troops, keeping them ignorant.”185 To retain his leadership advantage, the 
people should not know his mind.
186
 A thinking individual who knows his enemy and his 
subjects is celebrated by Sunzi as someone who enables the group to survive. Great leaders must 
be aware of the nuances of humanity—personalities, habits, and so forth—as well as the 
potentialities or possible changes in the situations humans may find themselves in. The leader is 
a student of human experience and for this reason is creative and adaptable rather than a rigid 
follower of portents of Heaven: “The army does not maintain any constant strategic 
configuration of power (shih), water has no constant shape (hsing). One who is able to change 
and transform in accord with the enemy and wrest victory is termed spiritual.
187
  
To call forth this diversity of creativity is to create a “spiritual methodology.” The five 
very different types of intellect found in successful spies embody this diversity of creativity: 
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those who are savvy about local information, those who understand the internal affairs of an 
enemy, those who are attempting to gather your own strategies, those who can spread false 
information, and those who are able to survive in order to report. Sunzi says that “They are a 
ruler’s treasures.”188 This is true because their rational analysis attains “the true pinnacle of 
excellence” which helps to suppress an enemy without battle.189 Again, he stresses the 
significance of an individual’s self-knowledge, as opposed to knowledge of the cosmos, as 
bringing power into the leader’s hands in order to achieve victory: “Thus enlightened rulers and 
sagacious generals who are able to get intelligent spies will invariably attain great achievements. 
This is the essence of the military, what the Three Armies rely on to move.”190 To Sunzi, the 
significant component of a leader is the will to survive. In order to do so, he must use his own 
intellect and the intellect of others. This self-dependence eliminates the need for the Mandate of 
Heaven. Yet, for Sunzi, autonomy does not promote individual glory; instead, it serves to 
preserve the state because “a vanquished state cannot be revived, the dead cannot be brought 
back to life.”191  
The Romance of the Three Kingdoms       
 The novel begins with an allusion to its basic cycle of Chinese history: “The empire long 
divided, must unite; long united, must divide. Thus it has ever been.”192 The regeneration elicited 
from these changes stems from an accountability that new leadership invariably promises. While 
the previous chapter addresses the necessity for a leader to be benevolent in order to gain the 
Mandate of Heaven, the complication of the story arises in regard to who actually claims the 
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Mandate and reunifies China, with at least two distinct personalities and ideologies in the story 
competing and contrasting. The independent, self-made, aggressive, and flamboyant opportunist 
Cao Cao contrasts with Liu Bei, an ethical leader who abides by traditional Confucian precepts 
and rules of society. 
 The Son of Heaven—the person who receives the Mandate and begins a new dynasty or 
inherits the rule—is chosen ostensibly by Heaven, but only those who are benevolent and 
righteous and have filial piety and discernment could receive the Mandate.
193
 Of the two 
characters, Liu Bei is portrayed as an exemplary, benevolent Confucian ruler to whom the 
Mandate shall be given. On the opposite hand, Cao Cao strives to show that he actually obtains 
the Mandate of Heaven, when, in fact, he desires political hegemony. Yet, neither is an ideal 
leader according to Sunzi’s The Art of War because both strive for personal advantage in the end.  
Liu Bei and The Mandate 
 Originally, Liu Bei does not seek to rule but to protect the status quo—the Mandate held 
by the Han rule—from the rebellious. Readers find no thoughts of glory for himself in the novel, 
and he aligns with others of the same motivation: “We three—Liu Bei, Guan Yu, and Zhang 
Fei—though of different families, swear brotherhood, and promise mutual help to one end. . . . 
We swear to serve the state and save the people. . . ” (Chapter 1).194 Beyond this pivotal episode, 
in individual cases, Liu Bei continues to act in an ethical manner for the preservation of the Han 
rule.             
 For instance, when Cao Cao wishes to keep Liu Bei and Lu Bu from aligning against 
him, he attempts “the two tigers trick,” convincing the Emperor to instruct Liu Bei to kill Lu Bu 
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(Chapter 14).
195
 Cao Cao had reasoned that his ally Lu Bu most certainly could be considered a 
threat to Liu Bei. Suspecting Cao Cao’s motivation, Liu Bei is respectful to and protective of Lu 
Bu, rejecting Zhang Fei’s (his Peace Garden brother’s) warning and admonition to protect 
himself by obeying the orders to kill Lu Bu. But instead of acting in self preservation, he reacts 
with virtue and benevolence. This reaction had been forged in the original pact made in the 
Peach Garden to uphold the Mandate of the Han: “If we turn away from righteousness or forget 
kindliness, may Heaven and Human smite us!”196        
 Moreover, Liu Bei acknowledges that the man is deserving of respect, coming to him in 
desperation from a previous battle (Chapter 14).
197
 Liu Bei solidifies friendship between the two 
and thwarts Cao Cao’s plans to use Lu Bu to capture him. As a result of virtuous benevolence, it 
is Lu Bu who protects Liu Bei's family (and thus the Han lineage and Mandate) during the siege 
of Xuzhou (Chapter 15).
198
  
 Not only is Liu Bei a benevolent person who has the courage to risk his life, he is a 
righteous person who defends the Mandate of the Han. In Chapter 31, when Cao Cao invites Liu 
Bei to witness his power and domination of the court, he presumes that Liu Bei should honor 
him, but instead, Liu Bei is repulsed by Cao Cao’s attempt to usurp the Emperor’s position. Cao 
Cao asks him, “As my honored guest, you once received much kindness. Will you dishonor our 
friendship now?” Liu Bei responds by pulling an imperial decree from his girdle (the “girdle 
mandate”), reading “loud and clear” to Cao Cao’s chagrin: “You claim to be prime minister to 
the Han. In fact you are a traitor to the Han, whom I, a kinsman of the Han, am authorized by 
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imperial decree to punish.”199*  
 The morality revealed by this story serves to link Liu Bei to what appears to be a 
legitimate connection to the Mandate while it enhances Cao Cao’s determination to capture and 
destroy him. After a much heated battle in which Liu Bei is almost captured numerous times, he 
asks his followers to find a better leader for themselves: “I urge you to seek out another more 
enlightened lord in whose service you may distinguish yourselves.”200 This comment prompts 
Lord Guan Yu (one of the three members of the Peach Garden pact) to encourage him with the 
history of the Mandate: 
At the beginning of the Han when the founding emperor suffered so many 
reverses in his struggle for mastery . . . his success in a single battle at 
Nine Mile Mountain enabled him to establish a four-hundred-year 
patrimony. Reverses are common in war and must not be allowed to affect 
morale.
201
 
At this moment, the leader of Wu Kingdom in the south, Sun Quan, reminds Liu Bei that 
his Han kinsman, Liu Biao, will welcome a timely alliance to break Cao Cao’s growing 
power.
202
 Liu Biao’s immediate acknowledgment of his Han kinship with Liu Bei, despite 
warnings from his own trusted advisor, and Liu Bei’s acceptance of Liu Biao’s assistance are 
both links to the Mandate. These actions prepare the reader for Liu Bei’s eventual declaration as 
to why he will accept the Mandate (in order to protect the imperial house), even though he seems 
completely against doing so, throughout the novel.        
 Even in an emergency situation, Liu Bei is still reluctant to accept himself as Emperor. 
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No amount of reasoning by his beloved advisor Zhuge Liang will convince him that he does 
indeed have the Mandate to rule after Han Emperor Liu Xian is executed by Cao Cao’s son, Cao 
Pi: “Shall I emulate the conduct of renegade traitors?” he asks (Chapter 80).203 Only by 
pretending to be ill and appealing to his emotion does Zhuge Liang wring from Liu Bei a 
commitment to ascend the throne. When a concerned Liu Bei asks him what is causing his 
illness, Zhuge Liang is coy and illusive, until he believes Liu Bei is desperate enough about his 
health to acquiesce to his wishes. Zhuge Liang “revives” in order to say:  
Good fortune has placed the whole of the Riverland in Your Majesty’s 
hands, exactly as I predicted long ago. Now that Cao Pi [Cao Cao’s son] 
has usurped the throne . . . all our officers and officials . . . earnestly desire 
to serve Your Majesty as emperor and to share in the glory of eliminating 
the Cao clan and reviving the Liu. Your refusal was unthinkable.
204
 
He continues, predicting that the court will soon disperse because Liu Bei refuses to lead. 
Of course, Liu Bei responds that his refusal was not a pretext but a sincere sense of unworthiness 
for the Mandate of Heaven to fall to  him: “I fear the adverse judgment of the world,” he states, 
to which Zhuge Liang manipulates his emotions by responding: “What Heaven grants is refused 
only at peril.”205 When Liu Bei finally agrees, he finds that he has been duped into agreement 
because witnesses are hidden behind screens in order to expedite the process of making him 
emperor (Chapter 80).
206
  
 Although he is of the Liu imperial family and has the backing of “the common people 
and the chieftains,” he is reluctant to assume the throne, questioning their choice and the 
judgment of his subjects. When he is ascending the throne, as he accepts the role: He “tremble[s] 
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before that clear mandate.”207 He remains suspicious of taking the throne, and after he is 
emperor, he launches an attack and is defeated, convincing himself that he does not have the 
Mandate. His first imperial act—to attack Wu leader, Sun Quan, in the south rather than Wei 
leader Cao Pi in the west—destroys the newly established Han rule. He had never believed his 
“clear” mandate, but his highly vulnerable emotions allowed Zhuge Liang to convince him 
otherwise. And even though his people loved him, no one could change his situation. His 
reluctance in accepting the Mandate combined with his failure on the battlefield is telling. 
Moreover, when he performs his responsibilities as emperor of the Han, such as the sacrifices for 
the murdered Han Emperor Xian, he is sickened to the point of being incapable of administrative 
duties,
208
 thus revealing the chasm between the man and the natural connections that should 
manifest his appointment by Nature and Heaven. (See Chapter II.) Liu Bei’s motivation to 
protect the Han and reluctance to accept the Mandate greatly contrasts with Cao Cao’s ambition 
to take the throne in order to establish his own dynasty.  
Cao Cao and The Mandate 
 Cao Cao, conversely, does sincerely seek power, although to gain it, he first works for 
and through the Han Dynasty’s levels of advancement. Unlike Liu Bei, he is an expert at placing 
others at disadvantage or using them to gain advantage, as in the episode mentioned above when 
Cao Cao attempts to manipulate Lu Bu to kill Liu Bei. Unlike Liu Bei, who is obviously loved 
by the people and manifests the characteristics of the ideal Son of Heaven, Cao Cao contrives to 
pronounce his “mandate.” For instance during a royal hunt (Chapter 20), when all participants 
notice the golden arrow belonging to Emperor Xian (whom Cao Cao soon will turn into his 
puppet) has felled a distant deer, Cao Cao does not hesitate to ride forward to claim the arrow 
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and the kill, enraging all around at his impertinence for lying so that it would appear that he has 
the Mandate and for not allowing the Emperor to take the credit for his own marksmanship. Cao 
Cao is non-penitent, whatsoever, ambiguously taunting all that his “own” marksmanship is “only 
the good fortune of the Son of Heaven.”209 This is a man who takes what he wants and a man 
who believes himself worthy to do so, even though he was not born into the aristocracy or Han 
lineage. Cao Cao uses his self-worth and knowledge of himself to be observant of the worth of 
others. His ability to take advantage of this capacity is almost a parody of Sunzi’s directive to be 
aware of one’s own flaws in order to learn those of others. 210   
 Another example of his skill in taking advantage of situations to gain power is found 
when the “the dynasty [is] never at lower ebb” and the Han capital, Luoyang, is ruined due to the 
battle between Dong Zhuo (a powerful Han general who had set Emperor Xian on the throne)
211
 
and Sun Jian (king of Wu) (Chapters 11 and 12).
212
 As a result of his vulnerable state, the 
Emperor sends for Cao Cao for protection (Chapter 13).
213
 Cao Cao accepts advice from the 
Emperor’s advisors that he should move the court to Xuchang for safety (Chapter 14).214 Court 
astrologer, Wang Li, reads the stars and tells Liu Ai, the Director of the Imperial Clan, of his 
findings, who then relates the information to the Emperor of the Han: “The Mandate of Heaven 
does not permanently empower any dynasty, nor does any one of the five agents—water, fire, 
earth, wood, metal—remain ascendant forever. Fire, symbol of the Han, will be replaced by 
earth, symbol of the Wei” (Chapter 14).215 The knowledge of this secret petition affords Cao Cao 
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the methodology by which he completes his agenda to manipulate the Emperor to gain the 
Mandate.  
 Of the Five Phases (wuxing)—the agents216—each dynasty is associated with one in 
particular that will rise and fall in power. (See discussion in Chapter I.) The element associated 
with Cao Cao is earth, according to his advisors. The qualities of stubbornness and self-
centeredness are inherent with earth and cannot undermine the readily expansive nature of fire, 
the element associated with the Han and the virtue of justice. The advisors’ assessment is true as 
long as he focuses his strength and attacks in southwest China (Han). However, if he can bring 
the conflict to Wei, he will be victorious because earth is the virtue in control there. “The virtue 
of Han was fire; and your element is earth,” opportunistic Han advisor Xun Wenruo tells Cao 
Cao, “and so your fortune depends on your getting there. Fire can overcome earth as earth can 
multiply wood. [The Emperor’s advisors] agree and you have only to bide your time.”217 
Thus is exemplified Cao Cao’s capacity for seeking and gaining advantage for his own 
advancement, rather than for the good of the kingdom. Unlike any of the sages or worthy 
individuals who honestly believe that Heaven intends for them to claim the Mandate of Heaven, 
the irony—and perhaps the lesson—of The Romance of the Three Kingdoms is that Cao Cao is 
the one who is successful in wresting the Mandate away from the Han. There are no illusions for 
the reader that Heaven has meant for him to claim it. Yet, the episode just discussed sets into 
play the cruel and deliberate subversion of the Emperor’s power and safety by his own advisors. 
Cao Cao literally takes Han Emperor Xian as hostage, although (as also mentioned above) Liu 
Bei challenges Cao Cao’s legitimacy. Notwithstanding, Cao Cao does take the Han throne, and 
while Liu Bei is focusing his fury on Sun Quan (the son of Sun Jian who long ago had battled 
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Dong Zhuo over Luoyang*) because of the death of his Peach Garden “brother,” Lord Guan Yu, 
Cao Cao accepts an expedient Wu allegiance with Wei to undermine Liu Bei’s misdirected 
purposes.
218
  
 But even as Liu Bei and Sun Quan strategize against each other, Cao Cao’s own plan to 
“seize” the Mandate disintegrates before his eyes. Reinforcing his lack of virtue and worthiness, 
the appearance of Lord Guan Yu’s ghost prompts Cao Cao to create a “Foundation Hall” 
(Chapter 78). He believes that this new official building will not include the taunting apparition 
or the reminder of what Cao Cao considers to be a weakness—his belief in the supernatural. But 
when Cao Cao insists on harvesting the only lumber available for such a structure from a sacred 
pear tree whose “leafy canopy . . . seemed to reach the Milky Way,” we find that no one can cut 
down the tree. “I am held in fear and respect by all,” he says, “from the Son of Heaven to the 
common man. What perverse spirit here dares my wishes?”219 When Cao Cao himself attempts 
to control this spirit of nature, the sword he uses clangs as if it had hit metal, and blood 
“splashes” all over the frightened “king” of Wei.220 He has no virtue and, therefore, he has no 
support from heaven for his mandate of power according to this traditional interpretation from 
the author.  
 His rejection of the supernatural (thus Heaven) and his incapacity to relate to the natural 
world establishes for certain that he cannot manipulate the Mandate in the long term for two 
reasons. First of all, the pear tree guards the Vaulting Dragon Pool Temple
221
 that honors the fire 
of the dragon, with its indestructible Han nature, coming into play, even in Wei where earth is 
the strongest virtue. Secondly, just as with Liu Bei, Cao Cao does not have the necessary 
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interconnection with the natural world, as the Son of Heaven must actually embody. The natural 
world directly connects the Son of Heaven to the supernatural—to the cosmos. But in fact, Cao 
Cao’s encounters with several supernatural phenomena sicken him to the point of death,222 a 
counterpoint to Liu Bei’s illness when he assumes the Mandate of Heaven. (See page 69.) 
Truly his father’s son, Cao Pi continues the family tradition, eliminating any threats to his 
ascension to his father’s power  (Chapter 79). His Grand Corps Commander and his Grand 
Astrologer (both appointed by this new king) advise that portents point to a change of royal 
houses: “strange manifestations were reported: in Shiyi county a phoenix showed itself, in Linzi 
a unicorn appeared, and in Ye itself a yellow dragon was seen.”223 
Portents of change that connect civil strife to natural disasters or symbolic portents as 
those mentioned above were manipulated or fabricated and described with a level of skepticism 
that revealed that only those who were not elite would have accepted them as legitimate.
224
 Thus, 
in the epic, the Mandate is undermined, and the charade of legitimacy the father had begun 
continues with Cao Pi as “over forty civil and military officials” enter the royal chambers to use 
their interpretations of these signs to justify forcing Emperor Xian’s “ceremony of abdication”: 
“They beseech [His] Majesty to emulate the ancient sage‒king Yao by ceremonially 
relinquishing the mountains, rivers, dynastic shrines to the new king of Wei. This will fulfill the 
will of Heaven and satisfy the minds of men.”225 But Emperor Xian challenges this insult by 
asking what he’s actually done improperly to cancel the Han Mandate. Cao Pi’s men verify their 
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leader’s worthiness by responding that since he had come to the throne “grains grow luxuriantly 
and sweet dew has dropped from the skies.”226 Moreover the augury “graphs properly joined 
together read ‘Wei Xuchang’—that is, ‘Wei to receive the abdication of Han in the capital at 
Xuchang.’”227  
 Ironically, after the entire affair is completed, Cao Pi, as with his father, encounters a 
supernatural “rejection” of his claim: “as the new emperor began descending stairs from his 
throne to prostrate himself [in a ritual ceremony of thanks to Heaven and earth], a freak storm 
sprang up, driving sand and stones before it like a sudden downpour. All went dark; the altar 
lanterns blew out” (Chapter 80).228 And not surprisingly, as with his father, Cao Pi believes that 
the capital buildings are haunted; therefore, he moves the court back to Luoyang—where the 
virtue of fire is stronger than his own element of earth and where the Han have a traditional 
supernatural connection to nature itself. This cosmic connection is first seen long ago when 
Emperor Qin first saw signs of the new Han Mandate coming into being and therefore sought to 
destroy Han Gaozu (Liu Bang) who fled to the wilderness. His wife could always find him, 
though, because “There [were] always signs in the clouds over the place where [Liu Bang 
was].
229
 
Two of the portents mentioned earlier that Cao Pi’s followers interpreted—the phoenix 
and the yellow dragon—both are associated with the Han’s element, fire. Significantly, also, the 
unicorn is associated with eternal purity, perhaps Heaven itself. Although all of these may be 
interpreted as good omens, in regard to its history, these manifestations appear to be rejections of 
a Cao dynastic “mandate.” However, this rejection does not stop the family from ending the four 
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hundred-year-old rule of the Han and calling into question the theory of rule by Mandate, as with 
Liu Bei.  
 We see that nature and the supernatural realm appear to reject those who do not actually 
receive the Mandate of Heaven. Although the people may support either an extraordinarily kind 
or exceptionally cruel leader, according to Luo Guanzhong’s story, the Mandate is manifested in 
the signs from Heaven and the natural world as they connect to the Son of Heaven. Cao Cao’s 
house falls regardless of all its political and military strategies and manufactured support because 
it focuses on gaining power through popular acceptance and maintaining that power—rather than 
focusing on saving the order of the state.    
Conclusions 
Forty-five years after the establishment of the Cao throne Sima Yan (Cao Cao’s former 
general) claims the throne ostensibly to “aveng[e] the house of Han” (Chapter 119).230 Yet he 
follows Cao Pi’s model by forcing Cao Cao’s grandson, Cao Huan, to abdicate.”231 Prophetically 
and practically, a poet of later times observes: “Wei swallowed Han, and then Jin swallowed 
Wei; / From Heaven’s turning wheel no man can hide.”232 The Mandate claimed through the 
sovereignty of the people and political manipulation eventually fails. Similarly, Liu Bei fails to 
save the state and loses a Mandate that his advisors coerce him into claiming. As mentioned 
earlier, a great leader is a student of human experience, according to Sunzi, and for this reason is 
creative and adaptable rather than rigid—completely the opposite of Liu Bei when the Han 
dynasty needs him most. The people’s opinion that he had the Mandate does not matter because 
he does not have cosmic authority. Clearly, he embodies neither Tian ming nor Sunzi’s ideal 
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leader who would not seek or depend upon the Mandate of Heaven for the survival of the state.  
 As for Cao Cao, do we dare entertain the idea that he could be considered ideal according 
to the criteria set forth in The Art of War? Admittedly, he does succeed on the battlefield with no 
dependency on Heaven, although he appears to enjoy a tacit understanding among his court that 
winning equates to the manifestation of Heaven’s mandate. Additionally, his commoners believe 
that success translates to the Mandate of Heaven. The existence of a new dynasty is all the 
evidence required to prove that the Mandate has been reassigned.
233
 Might is right, but the 
appearance of virtue is also important to the masses. 
[T]he grand abstractions of political theory and ritual [are] less essential 
than the perception that the system [does] function: . . . This indeed was 
what the Mandate of Heaven was all about, a political, social, economic, 
and environmental system that could be seen by everyone to be reasonably 
successful.
234
 
Moreover, the Han’s appointed aristocracy had taken the place of the religious leadership 
that, in the past, identified the Son of Heaven based on careful analysis of action and character—
as well as signs that nature would be in harmony with Tian ming. But should they analyze Cao 
Cao’s character or the manner in which he reacted to situations he found himself in, traditional 
advisers would have found Cao Cao to be a leader without virtue. But regardless of the lack of 
this crucial characteristic, the historical context in which he lived lends insight into his 
character’s overwhelming success without it.  
 The old Confucian elite had lost its position throughout the Qin dynasty, as mentioned 
earlier, and by the time the Han began their rule, “power and [Confucian philosophical or 
intellectual] cultural prestige did not go hand in hand.”235 The revolutionary elite did not have the 
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same level of cultural and intellectual training or interest as had gone before, and ritual was 
dispensed with—until Emperor Gaozu (Liu Bang) realized that his newly “elected” elite had 
much to be desired in terms of civic behavior. Han advisor Shuson Tong suggested that 
cultivating benevolence and righteousness among them would reduce the threat of revolt, as 
would a return to ritual to achieve the semblance of order without the excessive punishment and 
laws of the Qin.
236
 
Eventually this contrived religiosity became a basis for a well-established dynasty whose 
rulers were declared legitimate based on their power and perceived virtue. We see in The 
Romance of the Three Kingdoms the culmination of the Han’s power base revealed in two 
characters in our study. Han practices of Heaven worship with its people’s mandate diminished 
the authentic Confucian‒influenced Liu Bei’s capacity to lead, while Cao Cao may actually 
appear to be an individual who could have been the embodiment of Sunzi’s military teachings. 
However, Cao Cao selfishly causes the state to fall instead of working to save it. In an act of pure 
political opportunism, the Han Emperor’s advisors defect, interpreting portents that insure that 
Cao Cao will gain the Mandate—if he will only take advantage of the situations he finds himself 
in. He does take their advice and bides his time, luring the Emperor away from safety and into 
his trap. Sunzi also would have advised a general to wait until the enemy is at a complete 
disadvantage so there would be no bloodshed upon capture or capitulation—the ideal victory. 
Yet Cao Cao is not altogether Sunzi’s ideal. This fact in itself is not as significant as his having 
razed the Han Dynasty with no supernatural power and no Mandate. 
 Although the Romance of the Three Kingdoms does reveal the significance of the 
Mandate of Heaven in relation to the culture of China, the work is a romance—with its folk tales, 
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its enchantment with the supernatural, and its grand narrative illuminating a philosophy that had 
been useful in controlling the populace in a glorious past. Although it is central to the novel, the 
concept of the Mandate of Heaven is compromised by reality. Liu Bei’s failure while relying on 
it and Cao Cao’s victory without it serve to illustrate that the theory of the Mandate of Heaven 
during the Han Dynasty as portrayed in The Romance of the Three Kingdoms is a bankrupt ideal. 
Future Studies           
 After examining the concepts of the Mandate of Heaven, benevolence, and leadership 
with Sunzi’s philosophical underpinnings in mind, one may more readily approach an evaluation 
of the entire epic in regard to the influence of Sunzi’s techniques or policies. As historians, our 
future studies of the classics The Art of War and The Romance of the Three Kingdoms may assist 
others to project successful lessons of personal interactions and leadership practices. Success? 
Failure? The Dao of Administration?
237
 The answer to these questions will depend on deep 
analyses of philosophies and qualities that have proven value—yet too often have been 
misunderstood. We have the opportunity to achieve the latter by encouraging a society looking 
on the surface of these classic texts for its own reflection to “read on.”238
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